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Abstract
Cloud DBs offer strong properties, including serializabil-
ity, sometimes called the gold standard database correctness
property. But cloud DBs are complicated black boxes, run-
ning in a different administrative domain from their clients;
thus, clients might like to know whether the DBs are meeting
their contract. A core difficulty is that the underlying problem
here, namely verifying serializability, is NP-complete [91].
Nevertheless, we hypothesize that on real-world workloads,
verifying serializability is tractable, and we treat the ques-
tion as a systems problem, for the first time. We build co-
bra, which tames the underlying search problem by blend-
ing a new encoding of the problem, hardware acceleration,
and a careful choice of a suitable SMT solver. cobra also
introduces a technique to address the challenge of garbage
collection in this context. cobra improves over natural base-
lines by at least 10× in the problem size it can handle, while
imposing modest overhead on clients.
1 Introduction and motivation
A new class of cloud databases has emerged, including prod-
ucts from Google [13, 14, 51], Amazon [2, 110], Microsoft
Azure [3], as well as their “cloud-native” open source al-
ternatives [5, 9, 10, 24]. Compared to earlier generations
of NoSQL databases (such as Facebook Cassandra, Google
Bigtable, and Amazon S3), members of the new class offer
the same scalability, availability, replication, and geodistri-
bution but in addition support a powerful programming con-
struct: strong ACID transactions. By “strong”, we mean that
the promised isolation contract is serializability [40, 91]: all
transactions appear to execute in a single, sequential order.
Serializability is the “gold standard” isolation level [34],
and the one that many applications and programmers implic-
itly assume (in the sense that their code is incorrect if the
database provides a weaker contract) [112].1 As the essential
correctness contract, serializability is the visible part of the
1Of course, there is something stronger, namely strict serializability [41,
91] (ss), which reflects real-time constraints; while the ss property is easier
to verify, it’s harder to provide with dependable performance [82]. For that
reason, many of these databases offer non-strict serializability, hence our
focus on that property.
entire iceberg (the cloud). This has to do with how the cloud
database is used [15, 18]: a user (developer or administrator)
deploys, for example, web servers as database clients. And,
based on whether the observed behaviors from clients are se-
rializable, the user can deduce whether the cloud database has
operated as expected. In particular, if the database has sat-
isfied serializability throughout one’s observation, then the
user knows that the database maintains basic integrity: each
value read derives from a valid write. It also implies that the
database has survived failures (if any) during this period.
A user can legitimately wonder whether cloud databases
in fact provide the promised contract. For one thing, users
have no visibility into a cloud database’s internals. Any in-
ternal corruption—as could happen from misconfiguration,
misoperation, compromise, or adversarial control at any layer
of the execution stack—can result in serializability violation.
And for another, one need not adopt a paranoid stance (“the
cloud as malicious adversary”) to acknowledge that it is diffi-
cult, as a technical matter, to provide serializability and geo-
distribution and geo-replication and high performance un-
der various failures [27, 60, 120]. Doing so usually involves
a consensus protocol that interacts with an atomic commit
protocol [51, 78, 85]—a complex, and hence potentially bug-
prone, combination.
As serializability is a critical guarantee, verifying that the
database is serializable is an important issue. Indeed, existing
works [45, 68, 90, 102, 108, 115, 117] can verify serializabil-
ity and/or other consistency anomalies. However, these works
share a limitation: they require “inside information”—(parts
of) the internal schedules of the database. Crucially, such in-
ternal schedules are invisible to the clients of cloud databases.
This leads to our question: how can clients verify the serial-
izability of a cloud database without inside information?
On the one hand, this question has long been known to
be intractable: Papadimitriou proved its NP-completeness
40 years ago [91]. On the other hand, one of the remark-
able aspects in the field of formal verification has been the
use of heuristics to “solve” problems whose general form
is intractable; recent examples include [59, 69, 70]. This
owes to major advances in solvers (advanced SAT and SMT
solvers) [35, 42, 48, 55, 65, 81, 89, 107], coupled with an ex-
plosion of computing power. Thus, our guiding intuition is
that it ought to be possible to verify serializability (without
inside information) in many real-world cases.
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And so, we are motivated to treat the italicized question
as a systems problem, for the first time. Compared to prior
works [84, 99, 102, 115] (§7), our underlying technical prob-
lem is different and computationally harder, which consists of
(a) positing an unmodifiable and black-box database, (b) re-
taining the database’s throughput and latency, and (c) check-
ing serializability, rather than a weaker property.
This paper describes a system called cobra. cobra com-
prises a third-party database (which cobra does not modify);
a set of (legacy) database clients (which cobra modifies to
link to a library); one or more history collectors that record
requests and responses to the database; and a verifier. The
history collectors periodically send history fragments to the
verifier, which has to determine whether the observed his-
tory is serializable. The deployer of cobra (also, the user of
the cloud database) defines the trust domain which encom-
passes database clients, collectors, and the verifier; while the
database is untrusted. Section 2 further details the setup. co-
bra’s verifier solves two main problems, outlined below.
1. Efficient witness search (§3). One can check serializ-
ability by searching for an acyclic graph whose vertices are
transactions and whose edges obey certain constraints; a con-
straint specifies that exactly one of two edges must be in the
searched-for graph. From this description, one suspects that a
SAT/SMT solver [23, 36, 55, 106] would be useful. But com-
plications arise. To begin with, encoding acyclicity in a SAT
instance brings overhead [61, 62, 74] (we see this too; §6.1).
Instead, cobra uses a recent SMT solver, MonoSAT [38],
that is well-suited to checking graph properties (§3.4). How-
ever, even MonoSAT alone is too inefficient (§6.1).
To address this issue, cobra reduces the search problem
size. First, cobra introduces a new encoding that exploits
common patterns in real workloads, such as read-modify-
write transactions, to efficiently infer ordering relationships
from a history (§3.1–§3.2). (We prove that cobra’s encoding
is a valid reduction in Appendix A.) Second, cobra uses par-
allel hardware (our implementation uses GPUs; §5) to com-
pute all-paths reachability over the known graph edges; then,
cobra is able to efficiently resolve some of the constraints,
by testing whether a candidate edge would generate a cycle
with an existing path.
2. Garbage collection and scaling (§4). cobra’s verifier
works in rounds. From round-to-round, however, the verifier
must trim history, otherwise verification would become too
costly. The challenge is that the verifier seemingly needs to
retain all history, because serializability does not respect real-
time ordering, so future transactions can read from values that
(in a real-time view) have been overwritten (§4.1). To solve
this problem, clients issue periodic fence transactions (§4.2).
The fences impose coarse-grained synchronization, creating
a window from which future reads, if they are to be serializ-
able, are permitted to read. This allows the verifier to discard
transactions prior to the window.
client
verifier
database
accept/
reject
…
history
collectors
client
history
Figure 1: Architecture of cobra. The trust domain is framed by
dashed lines.
We implement cobra (§5) and find (§6) that, compared
to our baselines, cobra delivers at least a 10× improvement
in the problem size it can handle (verifying a history of 10k
transactions in 14 seconds), while imposing minor through-
put and latency overhead on clients. End-to-end, on an ongo-
ing basis, cobra can sustainably verify 1k–2.5k txn/sec on
the workloads that we experiment with.
cobra’s main limitations are: First, given the underlying
problem is NP-complete, theoretically there is no guarantee
that cobra can terminate (though all our experiments finish
in reasonable time, §6). Second, range queries are not na-
tively supported by cobra; programmers need to add extra
meta-data in database schemas to help check serializability
on range queries.
2 Overview and background
Figure 1 depicts cobra’s high-level architecture. Clients is-
sue requests to a database and receive results. The database
is untrusted: the results can be arbitrary.
Each client request is one of five operations: start, com-
mit, abort (which refer to transactions), and read and write
(which refer to keys). Each client is single-threaded: it waits
to receive the result of the current request before issuing the
next request.
A set of history collectors sit between clients and the
database, and capture the requests that clients issue and the
(possibly wrong) results delivered by the database. This cap-
ture is a fragment of a history. A history is a set of operations;
it is the union of the fragments from all collectors.
A verifier retrieves history fragments from collectors and
verifies whether the history is serializable; we defined this
term loosely in the introduction and will make it more precise
below (§2.1). Verification proceeds in rounds; each round
consists of a witness search, the input to which is logically
the output of the previous round and new history fragments.
Clients, history collectors, and the verifier are trusted.
cobra’s architecture is relevant in real-world scenarios.
As an example, an enterprise web application uses a cloud
database for stability, performance, and fault-tolerance. The
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end-users of this application are geo-distributed employees
of the enterprise. To avoid confusion, note that the employ-
ees are users of the application, and the clients here are the
web application servers, as clients of the database.
Database clients (the application) run on the enterprise’s
hardware (“on-premises”) while the database runs on an un-
trusted cloud provider. The verifier also runs on-premises.
In this setup, collectors can be middleboxes situated at the
edge of the enterprise and can thereby capture the request-
s/responses between the clients and the database in the cloud.
The rest of this section defines the core problem more pre-
cisely and gives the starting point for cobra’s solution. Sec-
tion 3 describes cobra’s techniques for a single instance of
the problem while Section 4 describes the techniques needed
to stitch rounds together.
2.1 Preliminaries
First, assume that each value written to the database is unique;
thus, from the history, any read (in a transaction) can be asso-
ciated with the unique transaction that issued the correspond-
ing write. cobra discharges this assumption with logic in the
cobra client library (§5).
A history is a set of read and write operations, each of
which is associated with a transaction. Each read operation
must read from a particular write operation in the history. A
history is serializable if it matches a serial schedule [91]. A
schedule is a total order of all operations in the history. A
history and schedule match each other if executing the op-
erations following the schedule on a set of single-copy data
produces the same read results as the history. (The write oper-
ations are assumed to have empty returns so are irrelevant in
matching a history and a schedule.) A serial schedule means
that the schedule does not have overlapping transactions. In
addition to a serializable history, we also say a schedule is se-
rializable if the schedule is equivalent to a serial schedule—
executing the two schedules generates the same read results
and leaves the data in the same final state.
A schedule implies an ordering for every pair of conflicting
operations; two operations conflict if they are from different
transactions and at least one is write. These orderings (all of
them) form a set of dependencies among the transactions. For
example, if an operation of a transaction T1 writes a key, and
later in the schedule, an operation of transaction T2 writes the
same key, the dependency set contains a dependency denoted
as T1 → T2.
From a schedule and its dependency set, one can construct
a precedence graph that has a vertex for every transaction in
the schedule and a directed edge for every dependency im-
plied by the schedule. An important fact is that if the prece-
dence graph is acyclic, a serial schedule that is equivalent to
the original schedule can be derived, by topologically sorting
the precedence graph.
2.2 Verification problem statement
Based on the immediately preceding fact, the question of
whether a history is serializable can be converted to whether
the history matches a schedule whose precedence graph is
acyclic. So, the core problem is to identify such a precedence
graph, or assert that none exists.
Note that this question would be straightforward if the
database revealed its actual schedule (thus ruling out any
other possible schedule): one could construct that schedule’s
precedence graph, and test it for acyclicity. Indeed, this is the
problem of testing conflict-serializability [113]. Our prob-
lem, however, is testing view-serializability [116].2 In our
context, where the database is a black box (§1, §2), we have
to (implicitly) find schedules that match the history, and test
those schedules’ precedence graphs for acyclicity. Intuitively,
we will conduct this search by first listing all edges that
must exist—for example, a transaction reads from another’s
write—and then consider the edges between every other pair
of conflicting transactions (operations) as possibilities.
2.3 Starting point: Intuition and brute force
This section describes a brute-force solution, which serves as
the starting point for cobra and gives intuition. The approach
relies on a data structure called a polygraph [91], which cap-
tures all possible precedence graphs when some of the de-
pendencies are unknown.
In a polygraph, vertices (V) are transactions and edges (E)
are read-dependencies. A set C, which we call constraints,
indicates possible (but unknown) dependencies. Here is an
example polygraph:
W2(x)
W1(x) R3(x)
T1
T2
T3
It has three vertices V = {T1,T2,T3}, one known edge
E = {(T1,T3)} from W1(x) wr(x)−−−→ R3(x), and one constraint
〈 (T3, T2), (T2, T1) 〉 which is shown as two dashed arrows
connected by an arc. This constraint captures the fact that T3
cannot happen in between T1 and T2, because T3 reads x from
T1; and T2 which writes x either happens before T1 or after
T3. But it is unknown which option is the truth.
Formally, a polygraph P = (V , E, C) is a directed graph
(V , E) together with a set of bipaths, C; that is, pairs of
edges—not necessarily in E—of the form 〈(v, u), (u, w)〉
2Confusingly, in works targeting conflict serializability, the term “his-
tory” implies dependency information among conflicting transactions, and
refers to what we call a “schedule”. Even more confusingly, a database that
claims to implement conflict-serializability can, in our context, be tested only
for view-serializability, as the internal scheduling choices are not exposed.
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Figure 2: The verifier’s process, within a round and across rounds.
such that (w, v) ∈ E. A bipath of that form can be read as
“either u happened after v, or else u happened before w”.
Now, define the polygraph (V , E, C) associated with a his-
tory, as follows [113]:
• V are all committed transactions in the history
• E = {(Ti, Tj) |Tj reads from Ti}; that is, Ti wr(x)−−−→ Tj, for
some x.
• C = {〈 (Tj, Tk), (Tk, Ti) 〉 | (Ti wr(x)−−−→ Tj) ∧
(Tk writes to x) ∧ Tk 6= Ti ∧ Tk 6= Tj}.
The edges in E capture a class of dependencies (§2.1) that
are evident from the history, known as WR dependencies (a
transaction writes a key, and another transaction reads the
value written to that key). The third bullet describes how un-
certainty is encoded into constraints. Specifically, for each
WR dependency in the history, all other transactions that
write the same key either happen before the given write or
else after the given read.
A precedence graph is called compatible with a polygraph
if: the precedence graph has the same nodes and known edges
in the polygraph, and the precedence graph chooses one edge
out of each constraint. Formally, a precedence graph (V ′,E′)
is compatible with a polygraph (V , E, C) if: V = V ′, E ⊆ E′,
and ∀〈e1, e2〉 ∈ C, (e1 ∈ E′∧e2 /∈ E′)∨(e1 /∈ E′∧e2 ∈ E′).
A crucial fact is: there exists an acyclic precedence graph
that is compatible with the polygraph associated to a history
if and only if that history is serializable [91, 113]. This yields
a brute-force approach for verifying serializability: first, con-
struct a polygraph from a history; second, search for a com-
patible precedence graph that is acyclic. However, not only
does this approach need to consider |C| binary choices (2|C|
possibilities) but also |C| is massive: it is a sum of quadratic
terms, specifically
∑
k∈K pk · (qk − 1), where K is the set
of keys in the history, and each pk, qk are (respectively) the
number of reads and writes of key k.
3 Verifying serializability in cobra
Figure 2 depicts the verifier and the major components of ver-
ification. This section covers one round of verification. As a
simplification, assume that the round runs in a vacuum; Sec-
tion 4 discusses how rounds are linked.
cobra uses an SMT solver geared to graph properties,
specifically MonoSAT [38] (§3.4). Yet, despite MonoSAT’s
power, encoding the problem as in Section 2.3 would gener-
ate too much work for it (§6.1).
cobra refines that encoding in several ways. It introduces
write combining (§3.1) and coalescing (§3.2). These tech-
niques are motivated by common patterns in workloads, and
efficiently extract restrictions (on the search space) that are
available in the history. cobra’s verifier also does its own in-
ference (§3.3), prior to invoking the solver. This is motivated
by observing that (a) having all-pairs reachability informa-
tion (in the “known edges”) yields quick resolution of many
constraints, and (b) computing that information is amenable
to acceleration on parallel hardware such as GPUs (the com-
putation is iterated matrix multiplication; §5).
Figure 3 depicts the algorithm that constructs cobra’s en-
coding and shows how the techniques combine. Note that co-
bra relies on a generalized notion of constraints. Whereas
previously a constraint was a pair of edges, now a constraint
is a pair of sets of edges. Meeting a constraint 〈A,B〉 means
including all edges in A and excluding all in B, or vice versa.
More formally, we say that a precedence graph (V ′,E′) is
compatible with a known graph G = (V ,E) and generalized
constraints C if: V = V ′, E ⊆ E′, and ∀〈A, B〉 ∈ C, (A ⊆
E′ ∧ B ∩ E′ = ∅) ∨ (A ∩ E′ = ∅ ∧ B ⊆ E′).
We prove the validity of cobra’s encoding in Appendix A.
Specifically we prove that there exists an acyclic graph that
is compatible with the constraints constructed by cobra on
a given history if and only if the history is serializable.
3.1 Combining writes
cobra exploits the read-modify-write (RMW) pattern, in
which a transaction reads a key and then writes the same key.
The pattern is common in real-world scenarios, for example
shopping: in one transaction, get the number of an item in
stock, decrement, and write back the number. cobra uses
RMWs to impose order on writes; this reduces the orderings
that the verification procedure would otherwise have to con-
sider. Here is an example:
W3
W1 R2 W2
R4 W4 W3
W1 R2 W2
R4 W4
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1: procedure ConstructEncoding(history)
2: g, readfrom, wwpairs← CreateKnownGraph(history)
3: con← GenConstraints(g, readfrom, wwpairs)
4: con, g← Prune(con, g) // §3.3, executed one or more times
5: return con, g
6:
7: procedure CreateKnownGraph(history)
8: g← empty graph // the konwn graph
9: wwpairs← map {〈Key,Tx〉 → Tx} // consecutive writes
10: // map from a write Tx to a set of read Txs that read this write
11: readfrom← map {〈Key,Tx〉 → Set〈Tx〉}
12: for transaction tx in history:
13: g.Nodes += tx
14: for read operation rop in tx:
15: g.Edges += (rop.read from tx, tx) // add wr-edge
16: readfrom[〈rop.key, rop.read from tx〉] += tx
17:
18: // detect RMW (read-modify-write) transactions
19: for all Keys key that are both read and written by tx:
20: rop← the operation in tx that reads key
21: if wwpairs[〈key, rop.read from tx〉] 6= null:
22: reject // two successive writes, not serializable
23: wwpairs[〈key, rop.read from tx〉]← tx
24:
25: return g, readfrom, wwpairs
26:
27: procedure GenConstraints(g, readfrom, wwpairs)
28: // each key maps to set of chains; each chain is an ordered list
29: chains← empty map {Key→ Set〈List〉}
30: for transaction tx in g:
31: for write wrop in tx:
32: chains[wrop.key] += [ tx ] // one-element list
33:
34: CombineWrites(chains, wwpairs) // §3.1
35: InferRWEdges(chains, readfrom, g) // infer anti-dependency
36:
37: con← empty set
38: for 〈key, chainset〉 in chains:
39: for every pair {chaini, chainj} in chainset:
40: con += Coalesce(chaini, chainj, key, readfrom) // §3.2
41:
42: return con
43: procedure CombineWrites(chains, wwpairs)
44: for 〈key, tx1, tx2〉 in wwpairs:
45: // By construction of wwpairs, tx1 is the write immediately
46: // preceding tx2 on key. Thus, we can sequence all writes
47: // prior to tx1 before all writes after tx2, as follows:
48: chain1 ← the list in chains[key] whose last elem is tx1
49: chain2 ← the list in chains[key] whose first elem is tx2
50: chains[key] \= {chain1, chain2}
51: chains[key] += concat(chain1, chain2)
52:
53: procedure InferRWEdges(chains, readfrom, g)
54: for 〈key, chainset〉 in chains:
55: for chain in chainset:
56: for i in [0, length(chain)− 2]:
57: for rtx in readfrom[〈key, chain[i]〉]:
58: if (rtx 6= chain[i+1]): g.Edges += (rtx, chain[i+1])
59:
60: procedure Coalesce(chain1, chain2, key, readfrom)
61: edge set1 ← GenChainToChainEdges(chain1, chain2, key, readfrom)
62: edge set2 ← GenChainToChainEdges(chain2, chain1, key, readfrom)
63: return 〈edge set1, edge set2〉
64:
65: procedure GenChainToChainEdges(chaini, chainj, key, readfrom)
66: if readfrom[〈key, chaini.tail〉] = ∅:
67: edge set← {(chaini.tail, chainj.head)}
68: return edge set
69:
70: edge set← empty set
71: for rtx in readfrom[〈key, chaini.tail〉]:
72: edge set += (rtx, chainj.head)
73: return edge set
74:
75: procedure Prune(con, g)
76: // tr is the transitive closure (reachability of every two nodes) of g
77: tr← TransitiveClosure(g) // standard algorithm; see [52, Ch.25]
78: for c =〈edge set1, edge set2〉 in con:
79: if ∃(txi, txj) ∈ edge set1 s.t. txj  txi in tr:
80: g.Edges← g.Edges ∪ edge set2
81: con −= c
82: else if ∃(txi, txj) ∈ edge set2 s.t. txj  txi in tr:
83: g.Edges← g.Edges ∪ edge set1
84: con −= c
85: return con, g
Figure 3: cobra’s procedure for converting a history into a constraint satisfaction problem (§3). After this procedure, cobra feeds the results
(a graph of known edges G and set of constraints C) to a constraint solver (§3.4), which searches for a graph that includes the known edges
from G, meets the constraints in C, and is acyclic. We prove the algorithm’s validity in Appendix A.
There are four transactions, all operating on the same key.
Two of the transactions are RMW, namely R2,W2 and R4,W4.
On the left is the basic polygraph (§2.3); it has four constraints
(each in a different color), which are derived from consider-
ing WR dependencies.
cobra, however, infers chains. A single chain comprises
a sequence of transactions whose write operations are con-
secutive; in the figure, a chain is indicated by a shaded area.
Notice that the only ordering possibilities exist at the granu-
larity of chains (rather than individual writes); in the exam-
ple, the two possibilities of course are [W1, W2]→ [W3, W4]
and [W3, W4] → [W1, W2]. This is a reduction in the possi-
bility space; for instance, the original version considers the
possibility that W3 is immediately prior to W1 (the upward
dashed black arrow), but cobra “recognizes” the impossibil-
ity of that.
To construct chains, cobra initializes every write as a one-
element chain (Figure 3, line 32). Then, cobra consolidates
chains: for each RMW transaction t and the transaction t′ that
contains the prior write, cobra concatenates the chain con-
taining t′ and the chain containing t (lines 23 and 44–51).
Note that if a transaction t, which is not an RMW, reads
from a transaction u, then t requires an edge to u’s successor
(call it v); otherwise, t could appear in the precedence graph
downstream of v, which would mean t actually read from v
(or even from a later write), which does not respect history.
cobra creates the t→ v edge (known as an anti-dependency
in the literature [25]) in InferRWEdges (Figure 3, line 53).
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3.2 Coalescing constraints
This technique exploits the fact that, in many real-world work-
loads, there are far more reads than writes. At a high level,
cobra combines all reads that read-from the same write. We
give an example and then generalize.
W2
W1 R3
R4
R5 W2
W1 R3
R4
R5
A AB
three constraints one coalesced constraint 
In the above figure, there are five single-operation trans-
actions, to the same key. On the left is the basic poly-
graph (§2.3), which contains three constraints; each is in a
different color. Notice that all three constraints involve the
question: which write happened first, W1 or W2?
One can represent the possibilities as a constraint 〈A′, B′〉
where A′ = {(W1,W2), (R3, W2), (R4, W2)} and B′ =
{(W2,W1), (R5, W1)}. In fact, cobra does not include
(W1,W2) because there is a known edge (W1,R3), which, to-
gether with (R3,W2) in A′, implies the ordering W1 → R3 →
W2, so there is no need to include (W1,W2). Likewise, co-
bra does not include (W2,W1) on the basis of the known
edge (W2,R5). So cobra includes the constraint 〈A,B〉 =
〈{(R3, W2), (R4, W2)}, {(R5, W1)}〉 in the figure.
To construct constraints using the above reductions, cobra
does the following. Whereas the brute-force approach uses all
reads and their prior writes (§2.3), cobra considers particu-
lar pairs of writes, and creates constraints from these writes
and their following reads. The particular pairs of writes are
the first and last writes from all pairs of chains pertaining to
that key. In more detail, given two chains, chaini, chainj, co-
bra constructs a constraint c by (i) creating a set of edges
ES1 that point from reads of chaini.tail to chainj.head (Fig-
ure 3, lines 71–72); this is why cobra does not include
the (W1,W2) edge above. If there are no such reads, ES1 is
chaini.tail → chainj.head (Figure 3, line 67); (ii) building
another edge set ES2 that is the other way around (reads of
chainj.tail point to chaini.head, etc.), and (iii) setting c to be
〈ES1,ES2〉 (Figure 3, line 63).
3.3 Pruning constraints
Our final technique leverages the information that is encoded
in paths in the known graph. This technique culls irrelevant
possibilities en masse (§6.1). The underlying logic of the
technique is almost trivial. The interesting aspect here is that
the technique is enabled by a design decision to accelerate
the computation of reachability on parallel hardware (§5 and
Figure 3, line 77); this can be done since the computation is
iterated (Boolean) matrix multiplication. Here is an example:
W2
W1 R3
The constraint is 〈(R3,W2), (W2,W1)〉. Having precom-
puted reachability, cobra knows that the first choice cannot
hold, as it creates a cycle with the path W2  R3; cobra
thereby concludes that the second choice holds. Generaliz-
ing, if cobra determines that an edge in a constraint gen-
erates a cycle, cobra throws away both components of the
entire constraint and adds all the other edges to the known
graph (Figure 3, lines 78–84). In fact, cobra does pruning
multiple times, if necessary (§5).
3.4 Solving
The remaining step is to search for an acyclic graph that is
compatible with the known graph and constraints, as com-
puted in Figure 3. cobra does this by leveraging a constraint
solver. However, traditional solvers do not perform well on
this task because encoding the acyclicity of a graph as a set
of SAT formulas is expensive (a claim by Janota et al. [74],
which we also observed, using their acyclicity encodings on
Z3 [55]; §6.1).
cobra instead leverages MonoSAT, which is a particular
kind of SMT solver [42] that includes SAT modulo mono-
tonic theories [38]. This solver efficiently encodes and checks
graph properties, such as acyclicity.
cobra represents a verification problem instance (a graph
G and constraints C) as follows. cobra creates a Boolean
variable E(i,j) for each edge: True means the ith node has an
edge to the jth node; False means there is no such edge. co-
bra sets all the edges in G to be True. For the constraints C,
recall that each constraint 〈A,B〉 is a pair of sets of edges,
and represents a mutually exclusive choice to include either
all edges in A or else all edges in B. cobra encodes this in
the natural way: ((∀ea ∈ A, ea) ∧ (∀eb ∈ B,¬eb)) ∨ ((∀ea ∈
A,¬ea)∧(∀eb ∈ B, eb)). Finally, cobra enforces the acyclic-
ity of the searched-for compatible graph (whose candidate
edges are given by the known edges and the constrained edge
variables) by invoking a primitive provided by the solver.
cobra vs. MonoSAT. One might ask: if cobra’s encoding
makes MonoSAT faster, why use MonoSAT? Can we take
the domain knowledge further? Indeed, in the limiting case,
cobra could re-implement the solver! However, MonoSAT,
as an SMT solver, seamlessly leverages many prior optimiza-
tions. One way to think about the decomposition of function
in cobra is that cobra’s preprocessing exploits some of the
structure created by the problem of verifying serializability,
whereas the solver is exploiting residual structure common to
many graph problems.
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4 Garbage collection and scaling
cobra verifies periodically, in rounds. There are two motiva-
tions for rounds. First, new history is continually produced,
of course. Second, there are limits on the maximum problem
size (in terms of number of transactions) that the verifier can
handle (§6.2); breaking the task into rounds keeps each solv-
ing task manageable.
In the first round, a verifier starts with nothing and creates
a graph from CreateKnownGraph, then does verification.
After that, the verifier receives more client histories; it reuses
the graph from the last round (the g in ConstructEncoding,
Figure 3, line 5), and adds new nodes and edges to it from the
new history fragments received (Figure 2).
The technical problem is to keep the input to verifica-
tion bounded. So the question cobra must answer is: which
transactions can be deleted safely from history? Below, we
describe the challenge (§4.1), the core mechanism of fence
transactions (§4.2), and how the verifier deletes safely (§4.3).
Due to space restrictions, we only describe the general rules
and insights. A complete specification and correctness proof
are in Appendix B.
4.1 The challenge
The core challenge is that past transactions can be relevant
to future verifications, even when those transactions’ writes
have been overwritten. Here is an example:
W3(y)W1(x) W2(x)
R4(x) R4(y)
W3(y)W1(x)
R4(x) R4(y)
before deletion after deletion
T1 T2
T3
T4
T1
T3
T4
Suppose a verifier saw three transactions (T1, T2, T3) and
wanted to remove T2 (the shaded transaction) from consid-
eration in future verification rounds. Later, the verifier ob-
serves a new transaction T4 that violates serializability by
reading from T1 and T3. To see the violation, notice that
T2 is logically subsequent to T4, which generates a cycle
(T4
rw−→ T2  T3 wr−→ T4). Yet, if we remove T2, there is
no cycle. Hence, removing T2 is not safe: future verifications
would fail to detect certain kinds of serializability violations.
Note that this does not require malicious or exotic behav-
ior from the database. For example, consider an underlying
database that uses multi-version values and is geo-replicated:
a client can retrieve a stale version from a local replica.
Finally, we note that if the database told the verifier when
values are permanently overwritten, the verifier could use this
information to delete safely [58, 66]. But in our setup (§2), the
verifier does not get that information.
4.2 Fence transactions and epochs
cobra addresses this challenge by introducing fence trans-
actions that impose a coarse-grained ordering on all trans-
actions; the verifier can then discard “old” transactions sug-
gested by fence transactions. A fence transaction is a trans-
action that reads-and-writes a single key named “fence” (a
dedicated key that is used by fence transactions only). Each
client issues fence transactions periodically (for example, ev-
ery 20 transactions).
The fence transactions are designed to divide transactions
into different epochs in the serial schedule. What prevents
the database from defeating the point of fences by placing
all of the fence transactions at the beginning of a notional
serial schedule? The answer is that cobra requires that the
database’s serialization order not violate the order of trans-
actions issued by a given client (which, recall, are single-
threaded and block; §2). Production databases are supposed
to respect this requirement; doing otherwise would violate
causality. With this, the epoch ordering is naturally inter-
twined with the rest of the workload.
Given the preceding requirement, the verifier adds “client-
order edges” to the set of known edges in g (the verifier knows
the client order from the history collector). The verifier also
assigns an epoch number to each transaction. To do so, the
verifier traverses the known graph (g), locates all the fence
transactions, chains them into a list based on RMW rela-
tion (§3), and assigns their position in the list as their epoch
numbers. Then, the verifier scans the graph again, and for
each normal transaction on a client that is between fences
with epoch i and epoch j (j > i), the verifier assigns the nor-
mal transaction with an epoch number j− 1.
During the scan, assume the largest epoch number that has
been seen or surpassed by every client is epochagree, then we
have the following guarantee.
Guarantee. For any transaction Ti whose epoch ≤
(epochagree − 2), and for any transaction (including future
ones) Tj whose epoch ≥ epochagree, the known graph g con-
tains a path Ti  Tj.
To see why the guarantee holds, consider the problem in
three parts. First, for the fence transaction with epoch num-
ber epochagree (denoted as Fea), g must have a path Fea  
Tj. Second, for the fence transaction with epoch number
(epochagree − 1) (denoted as Fea−1), g must have a path as
Ti  Fea−1. Third, Fea−1 → Fea in g.
The guarantee suggests that no future transaction (with
epoch ≥ epochagree) can be a direct predecessor of such Ti,
otherwise a cycle will appear in the polygraph. We can extend
this property to use in garbage collection. In particular, if all
predecessors of Ti have epoch number≤ (epochagree−2), we
call Ti a frozen transaction, referring to the fact that no future
transaction can be its (transitive) predecessor.
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4.3 Safe garbage collection
cobra’s garbage collection algorithm targets frozen
transactions—as they are guaranteed to be no descendants
of future transactions. Of all frozen transactions, the verifier
needs to keep those which have the most recent writes to
some key (because they might be read by future transac-
tions). If there are multiple writes to the same key and the
verifier cannot distinguish which is the most recent one, the
verifier keeps them all. Meanwhile, if a future transaction
reads from a deleted transaction (which is a serializability
violation—stale read), the verifier detects this (the verifier
maintains tombstones for the deleted transaction ids) and
rejects the history.
One would think the above approach is enough, as we did
during developing the garbage collection algorithm. How-
ever, this turns out to be insufficient, which we illustrate using
an example below.
W2(d) W2(a) R3(a) W3(b)
R5(b) W5(c)
W1(d) W1(a)
W4(b) W4(c) R7(d)
R8(c)
 ≤ epochagree - 2 > epochagree
W6(b)
In this example, the shaded transaction (T3; transaction ids
indicated by operation subscripts) is frozen and is not the
most recent write to any key. However, with the two future
transactions (T7 and T8), deleting the shaded transaction re-
sults in failing to detect cycles in the polygraph.
To see why, consider operations on key c: W4(c), W5(c),
and R8(c). By the epoch guarantee (§4.2), both T4 and
T5 happen before T8. Plus, R8(c) reads from W5(c), hence
W4(c) must happen before W5(c) (otherwise, R8(c) should
have read from W4(c)). In which case, the constraint
〈(T5,T4), (T4,T3)〉 is solved (T5 → T4 conflicts with the fact
thatW4(c) happens beforeW5(c); hence, T4 → T3 is chosen).
Similarly, because of R7(d), the other constraint is solved and
T3 → T1. With these two solved constraints, there is a cycle
(T1  T4 → T3 → T1). Yet, if the verifier deletes T3, such
cycle would be undetected.
The reason for the prior undetected cycle is that the future
transaction may “finalize” some constraints from the past,
causing cycles whereas in the past the constraints were “cho-
sen” in a different way. To prevent cases like this, cobra’s
verifier keeps transactions that are involved in any potentially
cyclic constraints.
5 Implementation
The components of cobra’s implementation are listed in Fig-
ure 4. Our implementation includes a client library and a ver-
cobra component LOC written/changed
cobra client library
history recording 620 lines of Java
database adapters 900 lines of Java
cobra verifier
data structures and algorithms 2k lines of Java
GPU optimizations 550 lines of CUDA/C++
history parser and others 1.2k lines of Java
Figure 4: Components of cobra implementation.
ifier. cobra’s client library wraps other database libraries:
JDBC, Google Datastore library, and RocksJava. It enforces
the assumption of uniquely written values (§2.1), by adding a
unique id to a client’s writes, and stripping them out of reads.
It also issues fence transactions (§4.2). Finally, in our current
implementation, we simulate history collection (§2) by col-
lecting histories in this library; future work is to move this
function to a proxy.
For the verifier, we discuss two aspects of pruning (§3.3).
First, the verifier iterates the pruning logic within a round,
stopping when either it finds nothing more to prune or else
when it reaches a configurable maximum number of itera-
tions (to bound the verifier’s work); a better implementation
would stop when the cost of the marginal pruning iteration ex-
ceeds the improvement in the solver’s running time brought
by this iteration.
The second aspect is GPU acceleration. Recall that prun-
ing works by computing the transitive closure of the known
edges (Fig. 3, line 77). cobra uses the standard algorithm: re-
peated squaring of the Boolean adjacency matrix [52, Ch.25]
as long as the matrix keeps changing, up to log |V| matrix
multiplications. (log |V| is the worst case and occurs when
two nodes are connected by a (≥ |V|/2+1)-step path; at least
in our experiments, this case does not arise much.) The exe-
cution platform is cuBLAS [6] (a dense linear algebra library
on GPUs) and cuSPARSE [7] (a sparse linear algebra library
on GPUs), which contain matrix multiplication routines.
cobra includes several optimizations. It invokes a spe-
cialized routine for triangular matrix multiplication. (cobra
first tests the graph for acyclicity, and then indexes the ver-
tices according to a topological sort, creating a triangular ma-
trix.) cobra also exploits sparse matrix multiplication (cuS-
PARSE), and moves to ordinary (dense) matrix multiplica-
tion when the density of the matrix exceeds a threshold (cho-
sen to be ≥ 5% of the matrix elements are non-zero, the em-
pirical cross-over point that we observed).
Whenever cobra’s verifier detects a serializable viola-
tion, it creates a certificate with problematic transactions. The
problematic transactions are either a cycle in the known graph
detected by cobra’s algorithm, or a minimal unsatisfiable
core (a set of unsatisfiable clauses that translates to problem-
atic transactions) produced by the SMT solver.
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6 Experimental evaluation
We answer three questions:
• What are the verifier’s costs and limits, and how do these
compare to baselines?
• What is the verifier’s end-to-end, round-to-round sustain-
able capacity? This determines the offered load (on the
actual database) that the verifier can support.
• How much runtime overhead (in terms of throughput and
latency) does cobra impose for clients? And what are co-
bra’s storage and network overheads?
Benchmarks and workloads. We use four benchmarks:
• TPC-C [22] is a standard. A warehouse has 10 districts
with 30k customers. There are five types of transactions
(frequencies in parentheses): new order (45%), payment
(43%), order status (4%), delivery (4%), and stock level
(4%). In our experiments, each client randomly chooses a
warehouse and a district, and issues a transaction based on
the frequencies above.
• C-Twitter [4] is a simple clone of Twitter, according to
Twitter’s own description [4]. It allows users to tweet a
new post, follow/unfollow other users, show a timeline
(the latest tweets from followed users). Our experiments
include a thousand users. Each user tweets 140-word posts
and follows/unfollows other users based on Zipfian distri-
bution (α = 100).
• C-RUBiS [21, 28], simulates bidding systems like
eBay [21]. Users can register accounts, register items, bid
for items, and comment on items. We initialize the market
with 20k users and 200k items.
• BlindW is a microbenchmark we wrote to demonstrate
cobra’s performance in extreme scenarios. It creates a
set of keys, and runs random read-only and write-only
transactions on them. In our experiments, every transac-
tion has eight operations, and there are 10k keys in total.
This benchmark has two variants: (1) BlindW-RM repre-
sents a read-mostly workload that contains 90% read-only
transactions; and (2) BlindW-RW represents a read-write
workload, evenly divided between read-only and write-
only transactions.
Databases and setup. We evaluate cobra on Google Cloud
Datastore [13], PostgreSQL [19, 95], and RocksDB [20, 56].
They represent three database environments—cloud, local,
and co-located. In our experimental setup, clients interact
with Google Cloud Datastore through the wide-area Inter-
net, and connect to a local PostgreSQL server through a local
1Gbps network.
In the cloud and local database setups, clients run on two
machines with a 3.3GHz Intel i5-6600 (4-core) CPU, 16GB
memory, a 250GB SSD, and Ubuntu 16.04. In the local
database setup, a PostgreSQL server runs on a machine with
a 3.8GHz Intel Xeon E5-1630 (8-core) CPU, 32GB memory,
a 1TB disk, and Ubuntu 16.04. In the co-located setup, the
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Figure 5: cobra’s running time is faster than MonoSAT’s and Z3’s
on the BlindW-RW workload (solid lines) and the Twitter workload
(dashed lines). The same holds on the other benchmarks (not de-
picted). Verification runtime grows superlinearly.
same machine hosts the client threads and RocksDB threads,
which all run in the same process. We use a p3.2xlarge Ama-
zon EC2 instance as the verifier, with an NVIDIA Tesla V100
GPU, a 8-core CPU, and 64GB memory.
6.1 One-shot verification
In this section, we consider “one-shot verification”, the orig-
inal serializability verification problem: a verifier gets a his-
tory and decides whether that history is serializable. In our
setup, clients record histories fragments and store them as
files; a verifier reads them from the local file system. In this
section, the database is RocksDB (PostgreSQL gives similar
results; Google Cloud Datastore limits the throughput for a
fresh database instance which causes some time-outs).
Baselines. We have two baselines:
• Z3 [55]: we encode the serializability verification problem
into a set of SAT formulas, where edges are Boolean vari-
ables. We use binary labeling [74] to express acyclicity,
requiring Θ(|V|2) SAT formulas.
• MonoSAT [38] (with the “brute force” encoding): we im-
plement the original polygraph (§2.3), directly encode the
constraints (without the techniques of §3), and feed them
to MonoSAT.
Verification runtime vs. number of transactions. We com-
pare cobra to other baselines, on the various workloads.
There are 24 clients. We vary the total number of transac-
tions in the workload, and measure the total verification time.
Figure 5 depicts the results on two benchmarks. On all five
benchmarks, cobra does better than MonoSAT which does
better than Z3.3
3As a special case, there is, for TPC-C, an alternative that beats MonoSAT
and Z3 and has the same performance as cobra. Namely, add edges that
be inferred from RMW operations in history to a candidate graph (without
constraints, and so missing a lot of dependency information), topologically
sort it, and check whether the result matches history; if not, repeat. This
process has even worse order complexity than the one in §2.3, but it works
for TPC-C because that workload has only RMW transactions, and thus the
candidate graph is (luckily) a precedence graph.
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Figure 6: Decomposition of cobra runtime, on 10k-transaction
workloads. In benchmarks with RMWs only (the left one), there
is no constraint, so cobra doesn’t do pruning (see also footnote 3,
page 9); in benchmarks with many reads and RMWs (the middle
three), the dominant component is pruning not solving, because co-
bra’s own logic can identify concrete dependencies; in benchmarks
with many blind writes (the last one), solving is a much larger con-
tributor because cobra is not able to eliminate as many constraints.
Violation Database #Txns Time
G2-anomaly [12] YugaByteDB 1.3.1.0 37.2k 66.3s
Disappear writes [1] YugaByteDB 1.1.10.0 2.8k 5.0s
G2-anomaly [11] CockroachDB-beta 20160829 446 1.0s
Read uncommitted [17] CockroachDB 2.1 20? 1.0s
Read skew [16] FaunaDB 2.5.4 8.2k 11.4s
Figure 7: Serializability violations that cobra checks. “Violation”
describes the phenomena that clients experience. “Database” is
the database (with version number) that generates the violation.
“#Txns” is the size of the violation history. “Time” is the runtime
for cobra to detect such violation.
? The bug report only provides the history snippet that violates se-
rializability.
Detecting serializability violations. In order to investigate
cobra’s performance on an unsatisfiable instance: does it
trigger an exhaustive search, at least on the real-world work-
loads we found? We evaluate cobra on five real-world work-
loads that are known to have serializability violations. cobra
detects them in reasonable time. Figure 7 shows the results.
Decomposition of cobra’s verification runtime. We mea-
sure the wall clock time of cobra’s verification on our setup,
broken into three stages: constructing, which includes creat-
ing the graph of known edges, combining writes, and creating
constraints (§3.1–§3.2); pruning (§3.3), which includes the
time taken by the GPU; and solving (§3.4), which includes the
time spent within MonoSAT. We experiment with all bench-
marks, with 10k transactions. Figure 6 depicts the results.
Differential analysis. We experiment with four variants:
cobra itself; cobra without pruning (§3.3); cobra with-
out pruning and coalescing (§3.2), which is equivalent to
MonoSAT plus write combining (§3.1); and the MonoSAT
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with values above bars. On C-Twitter, each of cobra’s components
contributes meaningfully. On TPC-C, combining writes exploits the
RMW pattern and solves all the constraints (see also footnote 3,
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Figure 9: Verification throughput vs. round size (#txr). The veri-
fication capacity for BlindW-RM (the dashed line) is 2.3k txn/sec
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baseline. We experiment with three benchmarks, with 10k
transactions. Figure 8 depicts the results.
6.2 Scaling
We want to know: what offered load (to the database) can co-
bra support on an ongoing basis? To answer this question,
we must quantify cobra’s verification capacity, in txns/sec-
ond. This depends on the characteristics of the workload, the
number of transactions one round (§4) verifies (#txr), and
the average time for one round of verification (tr). Note that
the variable here is #txr; tr is a function of that choice. So
the verification capacity for a particular workload is defined
as: max#txr(#txr/tr).
To investigate this quantity, we run our benchmarks on
RocksDB with 24 concurrent clients, a fence transaction ev-
ery 20 transactions. We generate a 100k-transaction history
ahead of time. For that same history, we vary #txr, plot
#txr/tr, and choose the optimum.
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Figure 10: Throughput and latency, for C-Twitter benchmark. On the left is the in-process setup; 90th percentile latency increases 64%, with
31% throughput penalty, an artifact of history collection (disk bandwidth contention between clients and the DB). In the middle is the local
setup (PostgreSQL), where cobra imposes minor overhead. Finally, on the right is the cloud setup; there is an artifact here too: the throughput
penalty reflects a ceiling imposed by the cloud service for a fresh DB instance.
workload network overhead historytraffic percentage size
BWrite-RW 227.4 KB 7.28% 245.5 KB
C-Twitter 292.9 KB 4.46% 200.7 KB
C-RUBiS 107.5 KB 4.53% 148.9 KB
TPC-C 78.2 KB 2.17% 1380.8 KB
Figure 11: Network and storage overheads per one thousand trans-
actions. The network overheads comes from fence transactions and
the metadata (transaction ids and write ids) added by cobra’s client
library.
Figure 9 depicts the results. When #txr is smaller, cobra
wastes cycles on redundant verification; when #txr is larger,
cobra suffers from a problem size that is too large (recall that
verification time increases superlinearly; §6.1). For different
workloads, the optimal choices of #txr are different.
In workload BlindW-RW, cobra runs out of GPU memory.
The reason is that due to many blind writes in this workload,
cobra is unable to garbage collect enough transactions and
fit the remaining history into the GPU memory. Our future
work is to investigate this case and design a more efficient (in
terms of deleting more transactions) algorithm.
6.3 cobra online overheads
The baseline in this section is the legacy system; that is,
clients use the unmodified database library (for example,
JDBC), with no recording of history.
Throughput latency analysis. We evaluate cobra’s client-
side throughput and latency in the three setups, tuning the
number of clients (up to 256) to saturate the databases. Fig-
ure 10 depicts the results.
Network cost and history size. We evaluate the network traf-
fic on the client side by tracking the number of bytes sent over
the NIC. We measure the history size by summing sizes of the
history files. Figure 11 summarizes.
7 Related work
Below, we cover many works that wish to verify or enforce the
correctness of storage, some with very similar motivations to
ours. As stated earlier (§1), our problem statement is differen-
tiated by combining requirements: (a) a black box database,
(b) performance and concurrency approximating that of a co-
bra-less system, and (c) checking view-serializability.
Isolation testing and Consistency testing. Serializability is
a particular isolation level in a transactional system—the I
in ACID transactions. Because checking view-serializability
is NP-complete [91], to the best of our knowledge, all works
testing serializability prior to cobra are checking conflict-
serializability where the write-write ordering is known. Sinha
et al. [102] record the ordering of operations in a modified
software transactional memory library to reduce the search
space in checking serializability; this work uses the polygraph
data structure (§2.3). The idea of recording order to help test
serializability has also been used in detecting data races in
multi-threaded programs [68, 108, 115].
In shared memory systems and systems that offer replica-
tion (but do not necessarily support transactions), there is an
analogous correctness contract, namely consistency. (Con-
fusingly, the “C(onsistency)” in ACID transactions refers to
something else, namely semantic invariants [33].) Example
consistency models are linearizability [71], sequential con-
sistency [79], and eventual consistency [93].
Testing for these consistency models is an analogous prob-
lem to ours. In both cases, one searches for a schedule that
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fits the ordering constraints of both the model and the his-
tory [64]. As in checking serializability, the computational
complexity of checking consistency decreases if a stronger
model is targeted (for example, linearizability vs. sequential
consistency) [63], or if more ordering information can be (in-
trusively) acquired (by opening black boxes) [114].
Concerto [30] uses deferred verification, allowing it to ex-
ploit an offline memory checking algorithm [43] to check on-
line the sequential consistency of a highly concurrent key-
value store. Concerto’s design achieves orders-of-magnitude
performance improvement compared to Merkle tree-based
approaches [43, 88], but it also requires modifications of the
database. (See elsewhere [57, 80] for related algorithms.)
A body of work examines cloud storage consistency [26,
29, 83, 84]. These works rely on extra ordering infor-
mation obtained through techniques like loosely- or well-
synchronized clocks [26, 29, 64, 76, 84], or client-to-client
communication [83, 101]. As another example, a gateway
that sequences the requests can ensure consistency by enforc-
ing ordering [73, 94, 101, 104]. Some of cobra’s techniques
are reminiscent of these works, such as its use of precedence
graphs [29, 64]. However, a substantial difference is that co-
bra neither modifies the “memory” (the database) to get in-
formation about the actual internal schedule nor depends on
external synchronization. cobra of course exploits epochs
for safe deletion (§4), but this is a performance optimiza-
tion, not core to the verification task, and invokes standard
database interfaces.
Execution integrity. Our problem relates to the broad cate-
gory of execution integrity—ensuring that a module in an-
other administrative domain is executing as expected. For
example, Orochi [109] is an end-to-end audit that gives a
verifier assurance that a given web application, including its
database, is executing according to the code it is allegedly
running. Orochi operates in a setting reminiscent of the one
that we consider in this paper, in which there are collectors
and an untrusted cloud service. Verena [75] operates in a
similar model (but makes fewer assumptions, in that its hash
server and application server are mutually distrustful); Ver-
ena uses authenticated data structures and a careful place-
ment of function to guarantee to the deployer of a given web
service, backed by a database, that the delivered web pages
are correct. Orochi and Verena require that the database is
strictly serializable, they provide end-to-end verification of
a full stack, but they cannot treat that stack as a black box.
cobra is the other way around: it of course tolerates (non-
strict) serializability, its verification purview is limited to the
database, but it treats the database as a black box.
Other examples of execution integrity include AVM [67]
and Ripley [111], which involve checking an untrusted mod-
ule by re-executing the inputs to it. These systems likewise
are “full stack” but “not black box.”
Another approach is to use trusted components. For exam-
ple, Byzantine fault tolerant (BFT) replication [49] (where
the assumption is that a super-majority is not faulty) and
TEEs (trusted execution environments, comprising TPM-
based systems [50, 70, 86, 87, 92, 96, 98, 105] and SGX-
based systems [31, 32, 37, 72, 77, 97, 100, 104]) ensure that
the right code is running. However, this does not ensure that
the code itself is right; concretely, if a database violates seri-
alizability owing to an implementation bug, neither BFT nor
SGX hardware helps.
There is also a class of systems that uses complexity-
theoretic and cryptographic mechanisms [44, 99, 118, 119].
None of these works handle systems of realistic scale, and
only one of them [99] handles concurrent workloads. An
exception is Obladi [53], which remarkably provides ACID
transactions atop an ORAM abstraction by exploiting a
trusted proxy that carefully manages the interplay between
concurrency control and the ORAM protocol; its perfor-
mance is surprisingly good (as cryptographic-based sys-
tems go) but still pays 1-2 orders of magnitude overhead in
throughput and latency.
SMT solver on detecting serializability violations. Several
works [46, 47, 90] propose using SMT solvers to detect seri-
alizability violations under weak consistency. The underlying
problem is different: they focus on encoding static programs
and the correctness criterion of weak consistency; while co-
bra focuses on how to encode histories more efficiently. The
most relevant work [103] is to use SMT solvers to permutate
all possible interleaving for a concurrent program and search
for serializablility violations. Despite of different setups, our
baseline implementation on Z3 (§6.1) has similar encoding
and similar performance (verifying hundreds of transactions
in tens of seconds).
Correctness testing for distributed systems. There is a
line of research on testing the correctness of distributed sys-
tems under various failures, including network partition [27],
power failures [120], and storage faults [60]. In particular,
Jepsen [8] is a black-box testing framework (also an analy-
sis service) that has successfully detected massive amount
of correctness bugs in some production distributed systems.
cobra is complementary to Jepsen, providing the ability to
check serializability of black-box databases.
Definitions and interpretations of isolation levels. cobra
of course uses precedence graphs, which are a common tool
for reasoning about isolation levels [25, 41, 91]. However,
isolation levels can be interpreted via other means such as ex-
cluding anomalies [39] and client-centric observations [54];
it remains an open and intriguing question whether the other
definitions would yield a more intuitive and more easily-
implemented encoding and algorithm than the one in cobra.
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A The validity of cobra’s encoding
Recall the crucial fact in Section 2.3: an acyclic precedence
graph that is compatible with a polygraph constructed from a
history exists iff that history is serializable [91]. In this sec-
tion, we establish the analogous statement for cobra’s encod-
ing. We do this by following the contours of Papadimitriou’s
proof of the baseline statement [91]. However cobra’s algo-
rithm requires that we attend to additional details, complicat-
ing the argument somewhat.
A.1 Definitions and preliminaries
In this section, we define the terms used in our main argument
(§A.2): history, schedule, cobra polygraph, and chains.
History and schedule. The description of histories and
schedules below restates what is in section 2.1.
A history is a set of read and write operations, each of
which belongs to a transaction.4 Each write operation in the
history has a key and a value as its arguments; each read op-
eration has a key as argument, and a value as its result. The
result of a read operation is the same as the value argument
of a particular write operation; we say that this read opera-
tion reads from this write operation. We assume each value
is unique and can be associated to the corresponding write;
in practice, this is guaranteed by cobra’s client library de-
scribed in Section 5. We also say that a transaction txi reads
(a key k) from another transaction txj if: txi contains a read
rop, rop reads from write wrop on k, and txj contains the write
wrop.
A schedule is a total order of all operations in a history. A
serial schedule means that the schedule does not have over-
lapping transactions. A history matches a schedule if: they
have the same operations, and executing the operations in
schedule order on a single-copy set of data results in the same
read results as in the history. So a read reading-from a write
indicates that this write is the read’s most recent write (to this
key) in any matching schedule.
Definition 1 (Serializable history). A serializable history is
a history that matches a serial schedule.
cobra polygraph. In the following, we define a cobra poly-
graph; this is a helper notion for the known graph (g in the
definition below) and generalized constraints (con in the def-
inition below) mentioned in Section 3.
Definition 2 (cobra polygraph). Given a history h, a cobra
polygraph Q(h) = (g, con) where g and con are generated
by ConstructEncoding from Figure 3.
We call a directed graph gˆ compatible with a cobra poly-
graph Q(h) = (g, con), if gˆ has the same vertices as g, in-
4The term “history” [91] was originally defined on a fork-join parallel
program schema. We have adjusted the definition to fit our setup (§2).
16
cludes the edges from g, and selects one edge set from each
constraint in con.
Definition 3 (Acyclic cobra polygraph). A cobra polygraph
Q(h) is acyclic if there exists an acyclic graph that is compat-
ible with Q(h).
Chains. When constructing a cobra polygraph from a his-
tory, function CombineWrites in cobra’s algorithm (Fig-
ure 3) produces chains. One chain is an ordered list of trans-
actions, associated to a key k, that (supposedly) contains a se-
quence of consecutive writes (defined below in Definition 5)
on key k. In the following, we will first define what is a se-
quence of consecutive writes and then prove that a chain is
indeed such a sequence.
Definition 4 (Successive write). In a history, a transaction
txi is a successive write of another transaction txj on a key k,
if (1) both txi and txj write to k and (2) txi reads k from txj.
Definition 5 (A sequence of consecutive writes). A sequence
of consecutive writes on a key k of length n is a list of transac-
tions [tx1, . . . , txn] for which txi is a successive write of txi−1
on k, for 1 < i ≤ n.
Although the overall problem of detecting serializability is
NP-complete [91], there are local malformations, which im-
mediately indicate that a history is not serializable. We cap-
ture two of them in the following definition:
Definition 6 (An easily rejectable history). An easily re-
jectable history h is a history that either (1) contains a trans-
action that has multiple successive writes on one key, or (2)
has a cyclic known graph g of Q(h).
An easily rejectable history is not serializable. First, if a
history has condition (1) in the above definition, there ex-
ist at least two transactions that are successive writes of the
same transaction (say txi) on some key k. And, these two
successive writes cannot be ordered in a serial schedule, be-
cause whichever is scheduled later would read k from the
other rather than from txi. Second, if there is a cycle in the
known graph, this cycle must include multiple transactions
(because there are no self-loops, since we assume that trans-
actions never read keys after writing to them). The members
of this cycle cannot be ordered in a serial schedule.
Lemma 7. cobra rejects easily rejectable histories.
Proof. cobra (the algorithm in Figure 3 and the constraint
solver) detects and rejects easily rejectable histories as fol-
lows. (1) If a transaction has multiple successive writes on the
same key in h, cobra’s algorithm explicitly detects this case.
The algorithm checks, for transactions reading and writing
the same key (line 19), whether multiple of them read this key
from the same transaction (line 21). If so, the transaction be-
ing read has multiple successive writes, hence the algorithm
rejects (line 22). (2) If the known graph has a cycle, cobra
detects and rejects this history when checking acyclicity in
the constraint solver.
On the other hand, if a history is not easily rejectable, we
want to argue that each chain produced by the algorithm is a
sequence of consecutive writes.
Claim 8. If cobra’s algorithm makes it to line 33 (imme-
diately before CombineWrites), then from this line on, any
transaction writing to a key k appears in exactly one chain
on k.
Proof. Prior to line 33, cobra’s algorithm loops over all the
write operations (line 30–31), creating a chain for each one
(line 32). As in the literature [91, 113], we assume that each
transaction writes to a key only once. Thus, any tx writing to
a key k has exactly one write operation to k and hence appears
in exactly one chain on k in line 33.
Next, we argue that CombineWrites preserves this invari-
ant. This suffices to prove the claim, because after line 33,
only CombineWrites updates chains (variable chains in the
algorithm).
The invariant is preserved by CombineWrites because
each of its loop iterations splices two chains on the same
key into a new chain (line 51) and deletes the two old chains
(line 50). From the perspective of a transaction involved in a
splicing operation, its old chain on key k has been destroyed,
and it has joined a new one on key k, meaning that the num-
ber of chains it belongs to on key k is unchanged: the number
remains 1.
One clarifying fact is that a transaction can appear in mul-
tiple chains on different keys, because a transaction can write
to multiple keys.
Claim 9. If cobra’s algorithm does not reject in line 22,
then after CreateKnownGraph, for any two distinct entries
ent1 and ent2 (in the form of 〈key, txi, txj〉) in wwpairs: if
ent1.key = ent2.key, then ent1.txi 6= ent2.txi and ent1.txj 6=
ent2.txj.
Proof. First, we prove ent1.txi 6= ent2.txi. In cobra’s algo-
rithm, line 23 is the only point where new entries are inserted
into wwpairs. Because of the check in line 21–22, the algo-
rithm guarantees that a new entry will not be inserted into
wwpairs if an existing entry has the same 〈key, txi〉. Also,
existing entries are never modified. Thus, there can never be
two entries in wwpairs indexed by the same 〈key, txi〉.
Second, we prove ent1.txj 6= ent2.txj. As in the litera-
ture [91, 113], we assume that one transaction reads a key at
most once.5 As a consequence, the body of the loop in line 19,
including line 23, is executed at most once for each (key,tx)
pair. Therefore, there cannot be two entries in wwpairs that
match 〈key, , tx〉.
5In our implementation, this assumption is guaranteed by cobra’s client
library (§5).
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Claim 10. In one iteration of CombineWrites (line 44),
for enti = 〈key, tx1, tx2〉 retrieved from wwpairs, there ex-
ist chain1 and chain2, such that tx1 is the tail of chain1 and
tx2 is the head of chain2.
Proof. Invoking Claim 8, denote the chain on key that tx1 is
in as chaini; similarly, denote tx2’s chain as chainj.
Assume to the contrary that tx1 is not the tail of chaini.
Then there is a transaction tx′ next to tx1 in chaini. But the
only way for two transactions (tx1 and tx′) to appear adjacent
in a chain is through the concatenation in line 51, and that re-
quires an entry entj = 〈key, tx1, tx′〉 in wwpairs. Because tx′
is already in chaini when the current iteration happens, entj
must have been retrieved in some prior iteration. Since enti
and entj appear in different iterations, they are two distinct en-
tries in wwpairs. Yet, both of them are indexed by 〈key, tx1〉,
which is impossible, by Claim 9.
Now assume to the contrary that tx2 is not the head of
chainj. Then tx2 has an immediate predecessor tx′ in chainj.
In order to have tx′ and tx2 appear adjacent in chainj, there
must be an entry entk = 〈key, tx′, tx2〉 in wwpairs. Be-
cause tx′ is already in chainj when the current iteration hap-
pens, entk must have been retrieved in an earlier iteration. So,
entk = 〈key, tx′, tx2〉 and enti = 〈key, tx1, tx2〉 are distinct
entries in wwpairs, which is impossible, by Claim 9.
Lemma 11. If h is not easily rejectable, every chain is a se-
quence of consecutive writes after CombineWrites.
Proof. Because h is not easily rejectable, it doesn’t contain
any transaction that has multiple successive writes. Hence,
cobra’s algorithm does not reject in line 22 and can make it
to CombineWrites.
At the beginning (immediately before CombineWrites),
all chains are single-element lists (line 32). By Definition 5,
each chain is a sequence of consecutive writes with only one
transaction.
Assume that, before loop iteration t, each chain is a se-
quence of consecutive writes. We show that after iteration t
(before iteration t + 1), chains are still sequences of consec-
utive writes.
If t ≤ size(wwpairs), then in line 44, cobra’s algorithm
gets an entry 〈key, tx1, tx2〉 from wwpairs, where tx2 is tx1’s
successive write on key. Also, we assume one transaction
does not read from itself (as in the literature [91, 113]), and
since tx2 reads from tx1, tx1 6= tx2. Then, the algorithm refer-
ences the chains that they are in: chain1 and chain2.
First, we argue that chain1 and chain2 are distinct chains.
By Claim 8, no transaction can appear in two chains on the
same key, so chain1 and chain2 are either distinct chains or
the same chain. Assume they are the same chain (chain1 =
chain2). If chain1 (= chain2) is a single-element chain, then
tx1 (in chain1) is tx2 (in chain2), a contradiction to tx1 6= tx2.
Consider the case that chain1 (= chain2) contains multi-
ple transactions. Because tx2 reads from tx1, there is an edge
tx1 → tx2 (generated from line 15) in the known graph of
Q(h). Similarly, because chain1 is a sequence of consecutive
writes (the induction hypothesis), any transaction tx in chain1
reads from its immediate prior transaction, hence there is an
edge from this prior transaction to tx. Since every pair of ad-
jacent transactions in chain1 has such an edge, the head of
chain1 has a path to the tail of chain1. Finally, by Claim 10,
tx2 is the head of chain2 and tx1 is the tail of chain1, as well
as chain1 = chain2, there is a path tx2  tx1. Thus, there is
a cycle (tx1 → tx2  tx1) in the known graph, so h is easily
rejectable, a contradiction.
Second, we argue that the concatenation of chain1 and
chain2, denoted as chain1+2, is a sequence of consecutive
writes. Say the lengths of chain1 and chain2 are n and m re-
spectively. Since chain1 and chain2 are distinct sequences of
consecutive writes, all transactions in chain1+2 are distinct
and chain1+2[i] reads from chain1+2[i−1] for i ∈ {2, . . . , n+
m} \ {n + 1}. For i = n + 1, the preceding also holds, be-
cause tx1 is chain1’s tail (= chain1+2[n]), tx2 is chain2’s head
(= chain1+2[n+1]), and tx2 is the successive write of tx1 (tx2
reads from tx1). Thus, chain1+2 is a sequence of consecutive
writes, according to Definition 5.
If t > size(wwpairs) and the loop ends, then chains don’t
change. As they are sequences of consecutive writes after
the final step (when t = size(wwpairs)), they still are after
CombineWrites.
In the following, when we refer to chains, we mean the state
of chains after executing CombineWrites.
A.2 The main argument
In this section, the two theorems (Theorem 12 and 17) to-
gether prove the validity of cobra’s encoding.
Theorem 12. If a history h is serializable, then Q(h) is
acyclic.
Proof. Because h is serializable, there exists a serial schedule
sˆ that h matches.
Claim 13. For any transaction rtx that reads from a trans-
action wtx in h, rtx appears after wtx in sˆ.
Proof. This follows from the definitions given at the start of
the section: if rtx reads from wtx in h, then there is a read
operation rop in rtx that reads from a write operation wrop
in wtx. Thus, as stated earlier and by definition of matching,
rop appears later than wrop in sˆ. Furthermore, by definition
of serial schedule, transactions don’t overlap in sˆ. Therefore,
all of rtx appears after all of wtx in sˆ.
Claim 14. For any pair of transactions (rtx, wtx) where rtx
reads a key k from wtx in h, no transaction wtx′ that writes to
k can appear between wtx and rtx in sˆ.
18
Proof. Assume to the contrary that there exists wtx′ that ap-
pears in between wtx and rtx in sˆ. By Claim 13, rtx appears
after wtx in sˆ. Therefore, wtx′ appears in sˆ before rtx and after
wtx. Thus, in sˆ, rtx does not return the value of k written by
wtx. But in h, rtx returns the value of k written by wtx. Thus,
sˆ and h do not match, a contradiction.
In the following, we use headk and tailk as shorthands to
represent, respectively, the head transaction and the tail trans-
action of chaink. And, we denote that txi appears before txj in
sˆ as txi <sˆ txj.
Claim 15. For any pair of chains (chaini, chainj) on the
same key k, if headi <sˆ headj, then (1) taili <sˆ headj and (2)
for any transaction rtx that reads k from taili, rtx <sˆ headj.
Proof. First, we prove taili <sˆ headj. If headj ∈ chainj then
headj 6∈ chaini, by Claim 8. If chaini has only one transaction
(meaning headi = taili), then taili = headi <sˆ headj.
Next, if chaini is a multi-transaction chain, it can be written
as
tx1, · · · txp, txp+1, · · · txn.
By Lemma 11, chaini is a sequence of consecutive writes on
k, so each transaction reads k from its prior transaction in
chaini. Then, by Claim 13, txp <sˆ txp+1, for 1 ≤ p < n. Now,
assume to the contrary that headj <sˆ taili (= txn). Then, by
the given, tx1(= headi) <sˆ headj <sˆ txn. Thus, for some
1 ≤ p < n, we have txp <sˆ headj <sˆ txp+1. But this is
a contradiction, because txp+1 reads k from txp, and thus by
Claim 14, headj cannot appear between them in sˆ.
Second, we prove that any transaction rtx that reads k from
taili appears before headj in sˆ. Assume to the contrary that
headj <sˆ rtx. We have from the first half of the claim that
taili <sˆ headj. Thus, headj appears between taili and rtx in sˆ,
which is again a contradiction, by Claim 14.
Now we prove that Q(h) is acyclic by constructing a com-
patible graph gˆ and proving gˆ is acyclic. We have the follow-
ing fact from function Coalesce.
Fact 16. In Coalesce, each constraint 〈A, B〉 is generated
from a pair of chains (chain1, chain2) on the same key k in
line 60. All edges in edge set A point to head2, and all edges in
B point to head1. This is because all edges in A have the form
either (rtx, head2) or (tail1, head2); see lines 67 and 71–72.
Similarly by swapping chain1 and chain2 (line 61 and 62),
edges in B point to head1.
We construct graph gˆ as follows: first, let gˆ be the known
graph of Q(h). Then, for each constraint 〈A, B〉 in Q(h), and
letting head1 and head2 be defined as in Fact 16, add A to gˆ
if head1 <sˆ head2, and otherwise add B to gˆ. This process
results in a directed graph gˆ.
Next, we show that all edges in gˆ are a subset of the total
ordering in sˆ; this implies gˆ is acyclic.
First, the edges in the known graph (line 15 and 58) are
a subset of the total ordering given by sˆ. Each edge added
in line 15 represents that the destination vertex reads from
the source vertex in h. By Claim 13, this ordering holds in
sˆ. As for the edges in line 58, they are added to capture the
fact that a read operation (in transaction rtx) that reads from
a write (in transaction chain[i]) is sequenced before the next
write on the same key (in transaction chain[i+1]), an ordering
that also holds in sˆ. (This is known as an anti-dependency in
the literature [25].) If this ordering doesn’t hold in sˆ, then
chain[i + 1] <sˆ rtx, and thus chain[i] <sˆ chain[i + 1] <sˆ rtx,
which contradicts Claim 14.
Second, consider the edges in gˆ that come from con-
straints. Take a constraint 〈A,B〉 generated from chains
(chain1, chain2) on the same key. If head1 <sˆ head2, then by
Fact 16 and construction of gˆ, all added edges have the form
(tail1, head2) or (rtx, head2), where rtx reads from tail1. By
Claim 15, the source vertex of these edges appears prior to
head2 in sˆ; thus, these edges respect the ordering in sˆ. When
head2 <sˆ head1, the foregoing argument works the same,
with appropriate relabeling. Hence, all constraint edges cho-
sen in gˆ are a subset of the total ordering given by sˆ. This
completes the proof.
Theorem 17. If Q(h) is acyclic, then the history h is serial-
izable.
Proof. Given that Q(h) is acyclic, cobra accepts h. Hence,
by Lemma 7, h is not easily rejectable. And, by Lemma 11,
each chain (after CombineWrites) is a sequence of consec-
utive writes.
Because Q(h) is acyclic, there must exist an acyclic di-
rected graph q that is compatible with Q(h).
Claim 18. If txi appears before txj in a chain chaink, then
graph q has txi  txj.
Proof. Because chaink is a sequence of consecutive writes, a
transaction tx in chaink reads from its immediate predecessor
in chaink, hence there is an edge in the known graph (gen-
erated by line 15) from the predecessor to tx. Because every
pair of adjacent transactions in chaink has such an edge and
txi appears before txj in chaink, txi  txj in Q(h)’s known
graph. As q is compatible with Q(h), such a path from txi to
txj also exists in q.
Claim 19. For any chain chaini (on a key k) and any trans-
action wtxj 6∈ chaini that writes to k, graph q has either: (1)
paths from taili and transactions that read keyfrom taili (if
any) to wtxj, or (2) paths from wtxj to all the transactions in
chaini.
Proof. Call the chain that wtxj is in chainj. By Claim 8, chainj
exists and chainj 6= chaini.
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For chaini and chainj, Q(h) has a constraint 〈A, B〉 that is
generated from them (line 40). This is because chaini and
chainj touch the same key k, and cobra’s algorithm cre-
ates one constraint for every pair of chains on the same key
(line 39). (We assume chaini is the first argument of function
Coalesce and chainj is the second.)
First, we argue that the edges in edge set A establish taili  
headj and rtx  headj (rtx reads k from taili) in the known
graph; and B establishes tailj  headi. Consider edge set A.
There are two cases: (i) there are reads rtx reading from taili,
and (ii) there is no such read. In case (i), the algorithm adds
rtx → headj for every rtx reading-from taili (line 71–72).
And rtx → headj together with the edge taili → rtx (added
in line 15) establish taili  headj. In case (ii), cobra’s algo-
rithm adds an edge taili → headj to A (line 67), and there is
no rtx in this case. Similarly, by switching i and j in the above
reasoning (except we don’t care about the reads in this case),
edges in B establish tailj  headi.
Second, because q is compatible with Q(h), it either (1)
contains A:
taili/rtx headj [proved in the first half]
 wtxj [Claim 18; wtxj ∈ chainj]
or else (2) contains B:
wtxj  tailj [Claim 18; wtxj ∈ chainj]
 headi [proved in the first half]
 tx [Claim 18; tx ∈ chaini]
The argument still holds if wtxj = headj in case (1): remove
the second step in (1). Likewise, if wtxj = tailj in case (2),
remove the first step in (2).
Claim 20. For any pair of transactions (wtx, rtx) where rtx
reads a key k from wtx and any other transaction wtx′ that
writes to k, graph q has either wtx′  wtx or rtx wtx′.
Proof. By Claim 8, wtx must appear in some chain chaini on
k. Each of the three transactions (wtx, rtx, and wtx′) has two
possibilities relative to chaini:
1. wtx is either the tail or non-tail of chaini.
2. rtx is either in chaini or not.
3. wtx′ is either in chaini or not.
In the following, we enumerate all combinations of the
above possibilities and prove the claim in all cases.
• wtx = taili.
Then, rtx is not in chaini. (If rtx is in chaini, its enclosing
transaction would have to be subsequent to wtx in chaini,
which is a contradiction, since wtx is last in the chain.)
• wtx′ ∈ chaini.
Because wtx is the tail, wtx′ appears before wtx in
chaini. Thus, wtx′  wtx in q (Claim 18).
• wtx′ 6∈ chaini.
By invoking Claim 19 for chaini and wtx′, q either has
(1) paths from each read (rtx is one of them) reading-
from taili (= wtx) to wtx′, therefore rtx wtx′. Or else
q has (2) paths from wtx′ to every transaction in chaini,
and wtx ∈ chaini, thus wtx′  wtx.
• wtx 6= taili ∧ wtx ∈ chaini.
• rtx ∈ chaini.
Because chaini is a sequence of consecutive writes on k
(Lemma 11) and rtx reads k from wtx, rtx is the succes-
sive write of wtx. Therefore, rtx appears immediately
after wtx in chaini.
• wtx′ ∈ chaini.
Because rtx appears immediately after wtx in chaini,
wtx′ either appears before wtx or after rtx. By
Claim 18, there is either wtx′  wtx or rtx  wtx′
in q.
• wtx′ 6∈ chaini.
By invoking Claim 19 for chaini and wtx′, q either
has (1) taili  wtx′, together with rtx  taili (or
rtx = taili) by Claim 18, therefore rtx  wtx′. Or
else q has (2) wtx′  wtx (wtx′ has a path to every
transaction in chaini, and wtx ∈ chaini).
• rtx 6∈ chaini.
If rtx 6∈ chaini, because of InferRWEdges (line 53),
rtx has an edge (in the known graph, hence in q) to the
transaction that immediately follows wtx in chaini, de-
noted as wtx∗ (and wtx∗ must exist because wtx is not
the tail of the chain).
• wtx′ ∈ chaini.
Because wtx∗ appears immediately after wtx in
chaini, wtx′ either appears before wtx or after wtx∗.
By Claim 18, q has either wtx′  wtx or wtx∗  
wtx′ which, together with edge rtx → wtx∗ from
InferRWEdges, means rtx wtx′.
• wtx′ 6∈ chaini.
By invoking Claim 19 for chaini and wtx′, q has ei-
ther (1) taili  wtx′ which, together with rtx →
wtx∗ (from InferRWEdges) and wtx∗  taili
(Claim 18), means rtx  wtx′. Or else q has (2)
wtx′  wtx (wtx′ has a path to every transaction in
chaini, and wtx ∈ chaini).
By topologically sorting q, we get a serial schedule sˆ. Next,
we prove h matches sˆ, hence h is serializable (Definition 1).
Since h and sˆ have the same set of transactions (because q
has the same transactions as the known graph of Q(h), and
thus also the same as h), we need to prove only that for every
read that reads from a write in h, the write is the most recent
write to that read in sˆ.
First, for every pair of transactions (wtx, rtx) such that rtx
reads a key k from wtx in h, q has an edge wtx→ rtx (added
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to the known graph in line 15); thus rtx appears after wtx in
sˆ (a topological sort of q). Second, by invoking Claim 20 for
(wtx, rtx), any other transaction writing to k is either “topo-
logically prior” to wtx or “topologically subsequent” to rtx.
This ensures that, the most recent write of rtx’s read (to k)
belongs to wtx in sˆ, hence rtx reads the value of k written by
wtx in sˆ as it does in h. This completes the proof.
B Garbage collection correctness proof
B.1 Verification in rounds
Besides the “one-shot verification” described in §3 and Ap-
pendix A, cobra also works for online verification and does
verification in rounds (pseudocode is described in Figure 12).
In each round, cobra’s verifier checks serializability on the
transactions that have been received. In the following, we de-
fine terms used in the context of verification in rounds: com-
plete history, continuation, strong session serializable, and
extended history.
Complete history and continuation. A complete history is a
prerequisite of checking serializability. If a history is incom-
plete and some of the transactions are unknown, it is impos-
sible to decide whether this history is serializable.
Definition 21 (Complete history). A complete history is a
history where all read operations read from the write opera-
tions in the same history.
For verification in rounds, in each round, cobra’s verifier
receives a set of transactions that may read from the transac-
tions in prior rounds. We call such newly coming transactions
a continuation [66].
Definition 22 (Continuation). A continuation r of a complete
history h is a set of transactions in which all the read opera-
tions read from transactions in either h or r.
We denote the combination of a complete history h and its
continuation r as h◦r. By Definition 21, h◦r is also a complete
history. Also, we call the transactions in future continuations
of the current history as future transactions.
In the following discussion, we assume that the transac-
tions received in each round are continuations of the known
history. However, in practice, the received transactions may
not form a complete history and cobra’s verifier has to adopt
a preprocessing phase to filter out the transactions whose pre-
decessors are unknown and save them for future rounds (for
simplicity, such preprocessing is omitted in Figure 12 which
should have happen in line 7.)
Strong session serializable. As mentioned in §4.2, trans-
actions’ serialization order in practice should respect their
causality which, in our context, is the transaction issuing or-
der by clients (or session). So, if a history satisfies serializ-
ability (Definition 1) and the corresponding serial schedule
preserves the transaction issuing order, we say this history is
strong session serializable, defined below.
Definition 23 (Strong session serializable history). A strong
session serializable history is a history that matches a serial
schedule sˆ, such that sˆ preserves the transaction issuing order
for any client.
Notice that cobra requires that each client is single-
threaded and blocking (§2). So, for one client, its transaction
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1: procedure VerifySerializability(history stream)
2: i← 0; g← empty graph
3: wwpairs← empty map {〈Key,Tx〉 → Tx}
4: readfrom← empty map {〈Key,Tx〉 → Set〈Tx〉}
5: while True:
6: i← i+ 1
7: hi ← fetch a continuation from history stream
8: g, readfrom,wwpairs←
9: CreateKnownGraph2(g, readfrom, wwpairs, hi)
10:
11: g, psccs← EncodeAndSolve(g, readfrom, wwpairs)
12:
13: g, readfrom,wwpairs← GarbageCollection(g, psccs)
14:
15: procedure CreateKnownGraph2(g, readfrom, wwpairs, h)
16: for transaction tx in h:
17: g.Nodes += tx
18: tx.frozen = False
19: for read operation rop in tx:
20: if rop.read from tx not in g: reject
21: g.Edges += (rop.read from tx, tx)
22: readfrom[〈rop.key, rop.read from tx〉] += tx
23: for all Keys key that are both read and written by tx:
24: rop← the operation in tx that reads key
25: if wwpairs[〈key, rop.read from tx〉] 6= null:
26: reject
27: wwpairs[〈key, rop.read from tx〉]← tx
28:
29: for each client c:
30: listc ← an ordered list of trsanctions issued by c in g
31: for i in [0, length(listc)− 2]:
32: g.Edges += (listc[i], listc[i+ 1])
33:
34: return g, readfrom, wwpairs
35:
36: procedure EncodeAndSolve(g, readfrom, wwpairs)
37: con← GenConstraints(g, readfrom, wwpairs)
38: con, g← Prune(con, g)
39:
40: formula← EncodeSMT(con, g)
41: solved←MonoSAT.solve(formula)
42: if not solved: reject
43:
44: psccs← GenPolySCCs(con, g)
45: return g, psccs
46:
47: procedure GenPolySCCs(con, g)
48: g′ ← g
49: g′.Edges← g′.Edges ∪ {all edges in con}
50: psccs← CalcStronglyConnectedComponents(g′)
51: return psccs
52:
53: procedure GarbageCollection(g, psccs)
54: epochagree ← AssignEpoch(g)
55: SetFrozen(g, epochagree)
56: SetObsolete(g, epochagree)
57: SetRemovable(g, psccs)
58: return SafeDeletion2(g, readfrom, wwpairs)
59: procedure AssignEpoch(g)
60: epoch num← 0
61: topo tx← TopologicalSort(g)
62: for tx in topo tx:
63: if tx writes to key “EPOCH”:
64: tx.epoch← epoch num
65: epoch num← epoch num + 1
66: for tx in topo tx:
67: if tx reads but not writes key “EPOCH”:
68: tx.epoch← tx.read from tx.epoch
69:
70: epochagree ← inf
71: for each client c:
72: listc ← an ordered list of trsanctions issued by c in g
73: rlistc ← reversed ordered list of listc
74: cur epoch← inf
75: for tx in rlistc:
76: if tx touches key “EPOCH”:
77: if cur epoch = inf:
78: epochagree ← min(epochagree, tx.epoch)
79: cur epoch← tx.epoch
80: else:
81: tx.epoch = (cur epoch = inf ? inf : cur epoch− 1)
82: return epochagree
83:
84: procedure SetFrozen(g, epochagree)
85: fepoch← epochagree − 2
86: for tx in g:
87: if tx.epoch ≤ fepoch and
88: all predecssors of tx in g have epoch ≤ fepoch:
89: tx.frozen← True
90:
91: procedure SetObsolete(g, epochagree)
92: fepoch← epochagree − 2
93: for tx in g:
94: if tx.epoch ≤ fepoch:
95: obsolete← True
96: for Key key that tx writes:
97: if 6 ∃txj, s.t. tx txj ∧ txj.epoch ≤ fepoch ∧ txj writes key:
98: obsolete← False; break
99: tx.obsolete← obsolete
100:
101: procedure SetRemovable(g, psccs)
102: for tx in g:
103: if tx.frozen = True:
104: if tx.obsolete = True or tx is read-only:
105: tx.candidate← True
106: for pscc in psccs:
107: if ∀tx ∈ pscc, tx.candidate = True:
108: for tx in pscc:
109: tx.removable← True
110:
111: procedure SafeDeletion2(g, readfrom, wwpairs)
112: for tx in g:
113: if tx.removable = True and tx doesn’t touch key “EPOCH”:
114: g.Nodes −= tx
115: g.Edges −= {edges with tx as one endpoint}
116: readfrom −= {tuples containing tx}
117: wwpairs −= {tuples containing tx}
118: return g, readfrom,wwpairs
Figure 12: cobra’s algorithm for verification in rounds.
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issuing order is the order seen by the corresponding history
collector (one client connects to one collector). The verifier
also knows such order by referring to the history fragments.
Extended history. In the following, we define a helper notion
extended history that contains the information of a history
that has parsed by cobra’s algorithm. An extended history e
of a history h is a tuple (g, readfrom, wwpairs) generated by
CreateKnownGraph2 in Figure 12, line 9.
Notice that in cobra’s algorithm each round reuses the
extended history e = (g, readfrom, wwpairs) from the pre-
ceding round. In the following, we use E(e, h) to repre-
sent CreateKnownGraph2(g, readfrom,wwpairs, h). And,
we use E(h) as a shortened form of E(∅, h).
Fact 24. For a complete history h and its continuation r,
E(h ◦ r) = E(E(h), r). Because readfrom and wwpairs only
depend on the information carried by each transaction, and
this information is the same no matter whether processing h
and r together or separately. For client ordering edges (Fig-
ure 12, line 29–32), since they are the ordering of transac-
tions seen by the collectors, the edges remain the same as
well.
Definition 25 (Deletion from an extended history). A dele-
tion of a transaction txi from an extended historyE(h) is to (1)
delete the vertex txi and edges containing txi from the known
graph g in E(h); and (2) delete tuples that include txi from
readfrom and wwpairs.
We use E(h) 	 txi to denote deleting txi from extended
history E(h).
B.2 Polygraph, cobra polygraph, pruned
polygraph, and pruned cobra polygraph
Notice that an extended history contains all information from
a history. So, instead of building from a history, both poly-
graph (§2.3) and cobra polygraph (Definition 2) can be built
from an extended history.
Specifically, constructing a polygraph (V , E, C) from an
extended history E(h) works as follows (which is similar to
what is in §2.3):
• V are all vertices in E(h).g.
• E = {(txi, txj) | 〈 , txi, txj 〉 ∈ E(h).readfrom}; that is,
txi
wr(x)−−−→ txj, for some x.
• C = {〈 (txj, txk), (txk, txi) 〉 | (txi wr(x)−−−→ txj) ∧
(txk writes to x) ∧ txk 6= txi ∧ txk 6= txj}.
We denote the polygraph generated from extended history
E(h) as P(E(h)).
Since constructing an extended history is part of cobra’s
algorithm, it is natural to construct a cobra polygraph from
an extended history, which works as follow: assign cobra
polygraph’s known graph to be E(h).g and generate con-
straints by invoking
GenConstraints(E(h).g, E(h).readfrom, E(h).wwpairs).
We denote the cobra polygraph generated from extended his-
tory E(h) as Q(E(h)).
In order to test strong session serializability, we add cliens’
transaction issuing order to polygraph and cobra polygraph
by inserting edges for transactions that are issued by the same
client. We call such edges client ordering edges (short as CO-
edges). For each client, these CO-edges point from one trans-
action to its immediate next transaction (Figure 12, line 29–
32).
Lemma 26. For a serializable history h, a serial schedule
that h matches is some topological sort of an acyclic graph
that is compatible with the polygraph without CO-edges (and
cobra polygraph without CO-edges) of h; and topological
sorting an acyclic graph that is compatible with the poly-
graph without CO-edges (and cobra polygraph without CO-
edges) of h results in a serial schedules that h matches.
Proof. First, we prove the Lemma for polygraph (then
later cobra polygraph). In Papadimitriou’s proof [91] (§3,
Lemma 2), when proving that h is serializable⇒ polygraph
is acyclic, the proof constructs an acyclic compatible graph
according to a serial schedule, which means that this serial
schedule is a topological sort of the constructed comptible
graph. On the other hand, when proving that polygraph is
acyclic ⇒ h is serializable, the proof gets the serial sched-
ule from topological sorting an ayclic compatible graph.
Similarly, for cobra polygraph, in Thoerem 12 (Ap-
pendix A), the proof constructs an acyclic compatible graph
from a serial schedule; and in Thoerem 17, the proof topolog-
ically sorts an acyclic compatible graph to generate a serial
schedule.
In the following, all polygraphs P(E(h)) and cobra poly-
graphs Q(E(h)) include client ordering edges by default.
Lemma 27. Given a complete history h and its extended his-
tory E(h), the following logical expressions are equivalent:
(1) history h is strong session serializable.
(2) polygraph P(E(h)) is acyclic.
(3) cobra polygraph Q(E(h)) is acyclic.
Proof. First, we prove that (1) ⇐⇒ (2).
(1) =⇒ (2): Because h is strong session serializable,
there exists a serial schedule sˆ that h matches and preserves
the transaction issuing order of clients. By Lemma 26, sˆ is one
of the topological sorts of some graph gˆ that is compatible
with the polygraph without client ordering edges. By adding
client ordering edges to gˆ, we get gˆ+. Graph gˆ+ is still com-
patible with P(E(h)), because edges of gˆ+ are a subset of the
total ordering of sˆ (ˆs preserves the clients’ transaction issuing
order). Thus, gˆ+ is acyclic, hence P(E(h)) is also acyclic.
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(2) =⇒ (1): Because polygraph P(E(h)) is acyclic, there
exists a compatible graph gˆ+ that is acyclic. By removing all
the client ordering edges from gˆ+, we have gˆ which is com-
patible with the polygraph without client ordering edges. Be-
cause gˆ has the same nodes but less edges than gˆ+, a topolog-
ical sort sˆ of gˆ+ is also a topological sort of gˆ. By Lemma 26,
sˆ is a serial schedule that hmatches. Because gˆ+ has client or-
dering edges, sˆ preserves transaction issuing order of clients,
hence h is strong session serializable.
Similarly, we can prove (1) ⇐⇒ (3) by replacing poly-
graph (with and without client ordering edges) with cobra
polygraph (with and without client ordering edges).
Pruned (cobra) polygraph. Given a cobra polygraph
Q(E(h)) = (g, con), we call the cobra polygraph after in-
voking Prune(con, g) (Figure 3, line 75) as a pruned cobra
polygraph, denoted as Qp(E(h)). Similarly, if we treat a con-
straint in a polygraph (for example 〈txi → txj, txj → txk〉) as a
constraint in cobra polygraph but with each edge set having
only one edge (〈{txi → txj}, {txj → txk}〉), then we can apply
Prune to a polygraph P(E(h)) and get a pruned polygraph,
denoted as Pp(E(h)).
Note that Q(E(h)) and Qp(E(h)) are what cobra’s algo-
rithm actually creates; P(E(h)) and Pp(E(h)) are helper no-
tions for the proof only—they are not actually materialized.
Lemma 28. Q(E(h)) is acyclic ⇐⇒ Qp(E(h)) is acyclic,
and P(E(h)) is acyclic ⇐⇒ Pp(E(h)) is acyclic.
Proof. First, we prove Q(E(h)) is acyclic ⇐⇒ Qp(E(h)) is
acyclic.
“⇒”. To begin with, we prove that pruning one constraint
〈A,B〉 from Q(E(h)) does not affect the acyclicity of the re-
maining cobra polygraph. If so, pruning multiple constraints
on an acyclic cobra polygraph still results in an acyclic co-
bra polygraph.
Now, consider the constraint 〈A,B〉 (A and B are edge sets)
that has been pruned in Q(E(h)), and assume it gets pruned
because of an edge (txi, txj) ∈ A such that txj  txi in the
known graph.
Because Q(E(h)) is acyclic, there exists a compatible
graph gˆ that is acyclic. For the binary choice of 〈A,B〉, gˆmust
choose B; otherwise gˆ would have a cycle due to the edge
(txi, txj) in A and txj  txi in the known graph. And, Prune
(Figure 3, line 78–84) does the same thing—add edges in B to
Qp(E(h))’s known graph, when the algorithm detects edges
in A conflict with the known graph. Hence, gˆ is compatible
with Qp(E(h)) and Qp(E(h)) is acyclic.
“⇐”. Because Qp(E(h)) is acyclic, there exists a compatible
graph gˆ′ that is acyclic. Consider all constraints in Q(E(h)):
for the pruned constraints, gˆ′ contains edges from one of the
two edge sets in the constraint; for those constraints that is
not pruned, Qp(E(h)) has them and gˆ′ selects one edge set
from each of them (gˆ′ is compatible with Qp(E(h))). Thus, gˆ′
contains one edge set from all constraints in Q(E(h)), so it is
compatible with Q(E(h)). Plus, gˆ′ is acyclic, hence Q(E(h))
is acyclic.
Now we prove that P(E(h)) is acyclic ⇔ Pp(E(h)) is
acyclic. Because the constraint in a polygraph is a special-
ization of the constraint in a cobra polygraph (each edge set
only contains one edge), the above argument is still true by
replacing Q(E(h)), Qp(E(h)) to P(E(h)), Pp(E(h)) respec-
tively.
Lemma 29. Given a history that is strong session serializ-
able, for any two transactions txi and txj, txi  txj in the
known graph of Pp(E(h)) ⇐⇒ txi  txj in the known graph
of Qp(E(h))
Proof. Because h is not easily rejectable, E(h)’s known
graph is acyclic and both Pp(E(h)) and Qp(E(h))’s known
graphs contain edges in E(h)’s known graph.
“⇒”. We prove that for any edge txa → txb in path txi  txj of
Pp(E(h)) (txa might be txi and txb might be txj), there always
exists txa  txb in Qp(E(h)). In Pp(E(h)) and Qp(E(h))’s
known graph, there are four types of edges. Three of them—
reading-from edges (Figure 12, line 21), anti-dependency
edge (Figure 3, line 58), and client order edges (Figure 12,
line 32)—are captured by E(h)’s known graph which shared
by both Pp(E(h)) and Qp(E(h)). Hence, if Pp(E(h))’s known
graph has txa → txb, Qp(E(h)) also has it.
Next, we prove that when edge txa → txb is the last type:
edges added by Prune (Figure 3, line 80,83) in Pp(E(h)),
Qp(E(h))’s known graph also has txa  txb.
Consider a constraint in Pp(E(h)) is 〈txr → txw2, txw2 →
txw1〉 where txw1 and txw2 writes to the same key; txr reads
this key from txw1. For txw1 and txw2 in Qp(E(h)), because
they write the same key, they are either (1) in the same chain,
or else (2) txw2 and txw2 belong to two chains and there is a
constraint about these two chains.
Given txa → txb is added by pruning a constraint in
Pp(E(h)), there are two possibilities:
• txa → txb is txr → txw2, which means txw1  txw2 (other-
wise, the constraint would not be pruned). InQp(E(h)), for
above case (1), because txw1  txw2, txr reading from txw1
has paths to the successive transactions (including txw2)
in the chain; for (2), because txw1  txw2, this constraint
would be pruned and txr  txw2.
• txa → txb is txw2 → txw1, which means txw2  txr. In
Qp(E(h)), for (1), txw2 must appear earlier than txw1 in the
chain (hence txw2  txr), because otherwise txr  txw2, a
contradiction; for (2), because txw2  txr, the tail of chain
that txw2 is in has a path to the head of txw1’s chain, hence
txw2  txw1 in Qp(E(h)).
“⇐”. Similarly, by swapping Pp(E(h)) and Qp(E(h)) in the
above argument, we need to prove that given a pruned con-
straint 〈A,B〉 in Qp(E(h)) which contains txa → txb, there
exists txa  txb in Pp(E(h)).
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Again, for a constraint 〈A,B〉 about two chains chaini and
chainj in Qp(E(h)) (headi/taili is the head/tail of chaini; rtxi
is a read transaction reads from taili). There are two possibil-
ities:
• txa → txb is rtxi → headj, which means headi  tailj.
Consider the constraint 〈rtxi → headj, headj → taili〉 in
Pp(E(h)). Given that h is serializable, two chains must be
schedule sequentially and cannot overlap, hence taili  
headj. Then, this constraint in Pp(E(h)) would be pruned
and there is an edge rtxi → headj.
• txa → txb is taili → headj, which means headi  tailj.
Call the second last transaction in chaini txk. Consider the
constraint 〈taili → headj, headj → txk〉 (taili reads from
txk). Again, because h is serializable, two chains cannot
overlap, and txk  headj. Thus, the constraint is pruned
and Pp(E(h)) has taili → headj.
(Extended) easily rejectable history. Given that a cobra
polygraph Q(E(h)) and a pruned cobra polygraph Qp(E(h))
are equivalent in acyclicity, we extend the definition of an
easily rejectable history (Definition 6) to useQp(E(h)) which
rules out more local malformations that are not strong session
serializable.
Definition 30 (An easily rejectable history). An easily re-
jectable history h is a history that either (1) contains a trans-
action that has multiple successive writes on one key, or (2)
has a cyclic known graph g in Qp(E(h)).
Corollary 31. cobra rejects (extended) easily rejectable
histories.
Proof. By Lemma 7, cobra rejects a history when (1) it con-
tains a transaction that has multiple successive writes one one
key; (2) If the known graph has a cycle in the known graph of
Qp(E(h)), cobra detects and rejects this history when check-
ing acyclicity in the constraint solver.
B.3 Poly-strongly connected component
In this section, we define poly-strongly connected compo-
nents (short as P-SCC) which capture the possible cycles that
are generated from constraints. Intuitively, if two transactions
appears in one P-SCC, it is possible (but not certian) there
are cycles between them; but if these two transactions do not
belong to the same P-SCC, it is impossible to have a cycle
including both transactions.
Definition 32 (Poly-strongly connected component). Given
a history h and its pruned cobra polygraph Qp(E(h)), the
poly-strongly connected components are the strongly con-
nected components of a directed graph that is the known
graph with all edges in the constraints added to it.
Lemma 33. In a history h that is not easily rejectable, for any
two transactions txi and txj writing the same key, if txi 6 txj
and txj 6 txi in the known graph of Qp(E(h)), then txi and
txj are in the same P-SCC.
Proof. By Claim 8, each of txi and txj appears and only ap-
pears in one chain (say chaini and chainj respectively). Be-
cause txi 6 txj and txj 6 txi, chaini 6= chainj. cobra’s al-
gorithm generates a constraint for every pair of chains on the
same key (Figure 3, line 39), so there is a constraint 〈A,B〉 for
chaini and chainj, which includes txi and txj.
Consider this constraint 〈A,B〉. One of the two edge sets
(A and B) contains edges that establish a path from the tail of
chaini to the head of chainj—either a direct edge (Figure 3,
line 67), or through a read transaction that reads from the tail
of chaini (Figure 3, line 72). Similarly, the other edge set es-
tablishes a path from the tail of chainj to the head of chaini. In
addition, by Lemma 11, in each chain, there is a path from its
head to its tail through the reading-from edges in the known
graph (Figure 3, line 15). Thus, there is a cycle involving all
transactions of these two chains. By Definition 32, all the
transactions in these two chains—including txi and txj—are
in one P-SCC.
B.4 Fence transaction, epoch, obsolete trans-
action, and frozen transaction
The challenge of garbage collecting transactions is that strong
session serializability does not respect real-time ordering
across clients and it is unclear to the verifier which transac-
tions can be safely deleted from the history (§4.1). cobra
uses fence transactions and epochs which generate obsolete
transactions and frozen transactions that address this chal-
lenge.
Fence transactions. As defined in §4.2, fence transactions
are predefined transactions that are periodically issued by
each client and access a predefined key called the epoch key.
Based on the value read from the epoch key, a fence transac-
tion is either a write fence transaction (short as Wfence) or a
read fence transaction (short as Rfence): Wfences read-and-
modify the epoch key; and Rfences only read the epoch key.
In a complete history, we define that the fence transactions
are well-formed as follows.
Definition 34 (Well-formed fence transactions). In a history,
fence transactions are well-formed when (1) all write fence
transactions are a sequence of consecutive writes to the epoch
key; and (2) all read fence transactions read from known
write fence transactions.
Claim 35. Given a complete history h that is not easily re-
jectable, fence transactions in h are well-formed.
Proof. First, we prove that all Wfences are a sequence of con-
secutive writes. Because the epoch key is predefined and re-
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served for fence transactions, Wfences are the only transac-
tions that update this key. Given that Wfences read-modify-
write the epoch key, a Wfence read from either another
Wfence or the (abstract) initial transaction if the epoch key
hasn’t been created.
Given that h is not easily rejectable, by Definition 30, there
is no cycle in the known graph. Hence, if we start from
any Wfence and repeatedly find the predecessor of current
Wfence on the epoch key (the predecessor is known because
Wfences also read the epoch key), we will eventually reach
the initial transaction (because the number of write fence
transactions in h is finite). Thus, all Wfences and the initial
transaction are connected and form a tree (the root is the ini-
tial transaction). Also, because h is not easily rejectable, no
write transaction has two successive writes on the same key.
So there is no Wfence that has two children in this tree, which
means that the tree is actually a list. And each node in this list
reads the epoch key from its preceding node and all of them
write the epoch key. By Definition 5, this list of Wfences is a
sequence of consecutive writes.
Second, because h is a complete history, all Rfences read
from transactions in h. Plus, only Wfences update the epoch
key, so Rfences read from known Wfences in h.
Epochs. Well-formed fence transactions cluster normal
transactions (transactions that are not fence transactions) into
epochs. Epochs are generated as follows (AssignEpoch in
Figure 12, line 59). First, the verifier traverses the Wfences
(they are a sequence of consecutive writes) and assigns them
epoch numbers which are their positions in the write fence se-
quence (Figure 12, line 62–65). Second, the verifier assigns
epoch numbers to Rfences which are the epoch numbers from
the Wfences they read from (Figure 12, line 66–68). Finally,
the verifier assigns epoch numbers to normal transactions and
uses the epoch number of their successive fence transactions
(in the same client) minus one (Figure 12, line 81).
During epoch assigning process, the verifier keeps track
of the largest epoch number that all clients have exceeded,
denoted as epochagree (Figure 12, line 78). In other words,
every client has issued at least one fence transaction that has
epoch number ≥ epochagree.
One clarifying fact is that the epoch assigned to each trans-
action by the verifier is not the value (an integer) of the epoch
key which is generated by clients. The verifier doesn’t need
the help from clients to assign epochs.
In the following, we denote a transaction with an epoch
number t as a transaction with epoch[t].
Lemma 36. If a history h is not easily rejectable, then a fence
transaction with a smaller epoch number has a path to any
fence transaction with a larger epoch number in the known
graph of E(h).
Proof. First, we prove that a fence transaction with epoch[t]
has a path to another fence transaction with epoch[t + 1].
Given history h is not easily rejectable, by Claim 35, fence
transactions are well-formed, which means all the Wfences
are a sequence of consecutive writes (by Definition 34). Be-
cause the Wfence with epoch[t] (t is its position in the se-
quence) and the Wfence with epoch[t + 1] are adjacent in
the sequence, there is an edge (generated from reading-from
dependency) from Wfence with epoch[t] to Wfence with
epoch[t + 1].
Now consider a Rfence with epoch[t] which reads the
epoch key from the Wfence with epoch[t]. Because cobra’s
algorithm adds anti-dependency edges which point from one
write transaction’s succeeding read transactions to its suc-
cessive write on the same key (Figure 3, line 58), there is
an edge from the Rfence with epoch[t] to the Wfence with
epoch[t + 1]. Plus, all Rfences with epoch[t + 1] read from
the Wfence with epoch[t + 1], hence fence transactions with
epoch[t] have paths to fence transactions with epoch[t + 1].
By induction, for any fence transaction with epoch[t + ∆]
(∆ ≥ 1), a fence transaction with epoch[t] has a path to it.
Claim 37. For a history h and any its continuation r, if
h ◦ r is not easily rejectable, then any normal transaction
with epoch[≤ epochagree − 2] has a path to any future normal
transaction in the known graph of E(h ◦ r).
Proof. Take any normal transaction txi with epoch[t] (t ≤
epochagree − 2) and call txi’s client C1. Because the epoch
of a normal transaction equals the epoch number of its suc-
cessive fence transactions in the same client minus one (Fig-
ure 12, line 81), there is a fence transaction txf in C1 with
epoch[t + 1] (t + 1 ≤ epochagree − 1). By Lemma 36, txf has
a path to any fence transaction with epoch[epochagree]. And,
by the definition of epochagree, all clients have at least one
fence transactions with epoch[≥ epochagree] in h. Thus, there
is always a path from txi—through txf and the last fence trans-
actions of a client in h—to the future transactions in r.
Frozen transaction. In this section, we define frozen trans-
actions. A frozen transaction is a transaction that no future
transaction can be scheduled prior to these transactions in any
possible serial schedule. Intuitively, if a transaction is frozen,
this transaction can never be involved in any cycles contain-
ing future transactions.
Definition 38 (Frozen transaction). For a history h that is
not easily rejectable, a frozen transaction is a transaction
with epoch[≤ epochagree − 2] and all its predecessors (in the
known graph of E(h)) also with epoch[≤ epochagree − 2].
Obsolete transaction. Recall that the challenge of garbage
collection is that cobra’s verifier does not know whether a
value can be read by future transactions. In the following, we
define obsolete transactions which cannot be read by future
transactions.
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Definition 39 (Obsolete transaction). For a history h that is
not easily rejectable, an obsolete transaction on a key x is a
transaction with epoch[≤ epochagree − 2] that writes to x and
has a successor (in the known graph of E(h)) that also has
epoch[≤ epochagree − 2] and writes to x.
Corollary 40. For an obsolete transaction on a key x, it’s
predecessors which has epoch[epochagree − 2] and writes x is
also an obsolete transaction on x.
Proof. Call the obsolete transaction txi and its predecessor
with epoch[epochagree − 2] that writes x as txj. By Defini-
tion 39, txi has a successor txk that has epoch[epochagree − 2]
and writes x. Hence, as a predecessor of txi’s, txj is also a
predecessor of txk. Thus, by Definition 39, txj is an obsolete
transaction.
Claim 41. For a history h and any its continuation r that
satisfies h ◦ r is not easily rejectable, no future transaction
can read key x from an obsolete transaction on x.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that there exists a future trans-
action txk reading key x from an obsolete transaction txi. By
Definition 39, there must exist another transaction txj with
epoch[≤ epochagree − 2] that writes to x and txi  txj.
Now, consider transactions (txi, txj, txk). In a polygraph,
they form a constraint: txi and txj both writes to key x; and
txk reads x from txi. The constraint is 〈txk → txj, txj → txi〉.
However, both options create cycles in the known graph of
E(h ◦ r) which is a contradiction to that h ◦ r is not easily
rejectable (Definition 6): (1) if choose txk → txj, because txj
is epoch[≤ epochagree − 2] and txk is a future transaction in r,
by Claim 37, txj  txk; (2) if choose txj → txi, because of
txi  txj, there is a cycle.
Claim 42. For a history h and any its continuation r that
satisfies h◦r is not easily rejectable, if a transaction txi reads
key x from an obsolete transaction on x, then txi has paths to
future transactions in the known graph of Pp(E(h ◦ r)).
Proof. By Definition 39, the obsolete transaction (call it txj)
has a successor that has epoch[≤ epochagree − 2] and writes
x. Call this successor txk.
Because both txj and txk write x and txi reads from txj, they
form a constraint 〈txi → txk, txk → txj〉. Since txk is a succes-
sor of txj, this constraint is pruned by Prune and txi → txk in
Pp(E(h ◦ r)). Plus, by Claim 37, txk has paths to any future
transactions, hence so does txi.
B.5 Removable transactions and solved con-
straints
In this section, we define removable transactions which are
deleted from the extended history by cobra’s algorithm (Fig-
ure 12, line 113).
Definition 43 (Candidates to remove). In a history that is
not easily rejectable, a transaction is a candidate to remove,
when
• it is a frozen transaction; and
• it is either a read-only transaction or an obsolete trans-
action on all keys it writes.
Claim 44. For a history h and any its continuation r that
satisfies h ◦ r is not easily rejectable, a future transaction
cannot read from a candidate to remove.
Proof. By Definition 43, a candidate to remove is either a
read-only transaction which do not have writes, or else an
obsolete transaction on all keys it writes, which by Claim 41
cannot be read by future transactions.
Definition 45 (Removable). For a history that is not easily
rejectable, a transaction is removable when it is a candidate
to remove and all the transactions in the same P-SCC are also
candidates to remove.
Solved constraint and unsolved constraint. As mentioned
in §2.3, a constraint in a polygraph involves three transac-
tions: two write transactions (txw1, txw2) writing to the same
key and one read transaction (txr) reading this key from txw1.
And, this constraint (〈txr → txw2, txw2 → txw1〉) has two or-
dering options, either (1) txw2 appears before both txw1 and txr
in a serial schedule, or (2) txw2 appears after them. We call a
constraint as a solved constraint when the known graph has
already captured one of the options.
Definition 46 (Solved constraint). For a history h that is not
easily rejectable, a constraint 〈txr → txw2, txw2 → txw1〉 is a
solved constraint, when the known graph of E(h) has either
(1) txw2  txw1, txw2  txr, or (2) txw1  txw2, txr  txw2.
Fact 47. Eliminating solved constraints doesn’t affect
whether a polygraph is acyclic, because the ordering of the
three transactions in a solved constraint has been already
captured in the known graph.
For those constraints that are not solved constraints, we
call them unsolved constraints. Notice that both solved con-
straints and unsolved constraints are defined on polygraph
(not cobra polygraph).
Lemma 48. Given a history h and a removable transaction t
in h, for any its continuation r that satisfies h ◦ r is not easily
rejectable, there is no unsolved constraint that includes both
t and a future transaction in r.
Proof. Call a constraint 〈txr → txw2, txw2 → txw1〉 (txw1 and
txw2 write to the same key x; txr reads x from txw1) where one
of the three transactions is removable and another is a future
transaction.
In the following, by enumerating all combinations of pos-
sibilities, we prove such a constraint is always a solved con-
straint.
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• The removable transaction is txr.
Because txr is removable, it is a frozen transaction. As a
predecessor of txr (txr reads from txw1), by Definition 38,
txw1 has epoch[≤ epochagree − 2]. Hence, the last trans-
action txw2 must be the future transaction. By Claim 37,
both txw1 and txr have paths to future transactions includ-
ing txw2. Thus, this constraint is a solved constraint.
• The removable transaction is txw1.
Because txr reads x from txw1, by Claim 44, txr cannot be
a future transaction. Hence, the future transaction must be
txw2.
Because txw1 has writes, by Definition 43, txw1 is an obso-
lete transaction on key x. Plus txr reads x from txw1, by
Claim 42, txr has paths to future transactions including
txw2. Thus, this constraint is a solved constraint.
• The removable transaction is txw2.
Because h is a complete history, it is impossible to have
txr ∈ h but the transaction it reads txw1 ∈ r. Also, because
there must be one future transaction (in r), txr ∈ h∧txw1 ∈
h is impossible. Hence, there are two possibilities:
• txw1 ∈ r ∧ txr ∈ r.
By Claim 37, txw2 has a path to future transactions in-
cluding txw1 and txr. Hence, the constraint is a solved
constraint.
• txw1 ∈ h ∧ txr ∈ r.
Now, consider the relative position of txw1 and txw2.
Because a future transaction txr reads from txw1, by
Claim 44, txw1 is not a candidate to remove. Further, by
Definition 45, txw1 and txw2 do not belong to the same
P-SCC. Hence, by Lemma 33, either txw1  txw2 or
txw2  txw1.
Assume txw1  txw2. Because txw2 a frozen trans-
action (txw2 is removable), by Definition 38, txw2 has
epoch[epochagree − 2]. Thus, by Corollary 40, txw1 is
an obsolete transaction on x, but it is read by a future
transaction txr, a contradiction to Claim 44.
Above all, txw2  txw1. And, by Claim 37, txw2  txr.
Hence, this constraint is a solved constraint.
Lemma 49. Given a history h that is not easily rejectable and
a continuation r, for any transaction txi that is removable, if
the known graph of E(h ◦ r) 	 txi is acyclic, then the known
graph of E(h ◦ r) is acyclic.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that the known graph of E(h◦
r) has a cycle. Because h is not easily rejectable, there is no
cycle in the known graph of E(h), hence the cycle must in-
clude at least one transaction (say txj) in r. Also, this cycle
must include txi, otherwise E(h ◦ r)	 txi is not acyclic.
Now, consider the path txj  txi in the cycle. If such path
has multiple edges, say txj  txk → txi, then because txi
is a frozen transaction, by Definition 38, transaction txk has
epoch[epochagree − 2]. Hence, by Claim 37, txk has a path to
the future transaction txj which generates a cycle in E(h◦r)	
txi, a contradiction.
On the other hand, assume the path is an edge txj → txi.
There are four types of edges in the known graph, but txj →
txi can be none of them. In particular,
• Edge txj → txi cannot be a reading-from edge (Figure 12,
line 21) because h is a complete history.
• Edge txj → txi cannot be an anti-dependency edge (Fig-
ure 3, line 58), in which case txj has to read from a prede-
cessor of txi. By Corollary 40, the predecessor being read
is an obsolete transaction, a contradiction to Claim 41.
• Edge txj → txi cannot be a client order edge (Figure 12,
line 32), because there is at least one fence transaction is-
sued after txi in the same client.
• Edge txj → txi cannot be an edge added by Prune (Fig-
ure 3, line 80,83). Because, by Lemma 48, there is no un-
solved constraint between txi and txj.
B.6 The main argument
Lemma 50. Given a history h and any continuation r that
satisfies h ◦ r is not easily rejectable, for any transaction txi
that is removable, E(E(h)	 txi, r) ⇐⇒ E(h ◦ r)	 txi
Proof. First, we prove E(E(h) 	 txi, r) ⇐⇒ E(E(h), r) 	
txi, which means that the final extended history remains the
same no matter when cobra’s algorithm deletes txi—before
or after processing r.
An extended history has three components: readfrom,
wwpairs, and the known graph g. For readfrom, because
txi is removable, by Claim 44, no future transactions in r
can read from it. So deleting txi before or after processing
r does not change the readfrom, and also no reading-from
edges (from txi to transactions in r) are added to the known
graph (Figure 12, line 21). Similarly, for wwpairs, there is no
read-modify-write transactions in r that read from txi, hence
wwpairs are the same in E(E(h)	 txi, r) and E(E(h), r)	 txi,
and no edges are added during InferRWEdges (Figure 3,
line 58). Also, because txi has epoch[epochagree − 2], there
must be a fence transaction that comes after txi from the same
client, hence there is no client order edge from txi to transac-
tions in r (Figure 12, line 32). Thus, the known graphs in both
extended historys are also the same.
Finally, by lemma 24, E(E(h), r) 	 txi ⇐⇒ E(h ◦ r) 	
txi.
Lemma 51. In a history that is strong session serializable,
for any unsolved constraint 〈txr → txw2, txw2 → txw1〉 that in-
cludes a removable transaction in Pp(E(h)), all three trans-
actions (txw1, txw2, and txr) are in the same P-SCC.
Proof. Consider the relative position of txw1 and txw2 in the
known graph of Pp(E(h)).
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• Assume txw2  txw1. Because of txw1 → txr (txr reads
from txw1), txw2  txr. By Definition 46, the constraint is
a solved constraint, a contradiction.
• Assume txw1  txw2. By Prune (Figure 3, line 80,83),
txr  txw2. Again, by Definition 46, the constraint is a
solved constraint, a contradiction.
• Finally, txw1 6 txw2 and txw2 6 txw1. By Lemma 29,
txw1 and txw2 are concurrent in the known graph of
Qp(E(h)) too. Thus, by Lemma 33, they are in the same
P-SCC.
Theorem 52. Given a history h that is strong session seri-
alizable and a continuation r, for any transaction txi that is
removable, there is:
Pp(E(h ◦ r)	 txi) is acyclic⇔ Pp(E(h ◦ r)) is acyclic.
Proof. First, we prove that if h ◦ r is easily rejectable, cobra
rejects (so that neither P(E(h ◦ r) 	 txi) nor P(E(h ◦ r)) is
acyclic). By Definition 6, h ◦ r either (1) contains a write
transaction having multiple successive writes, or else (2) has
cycles in the known graph of E(h ◦ r).
For (1), if the write transaction which has multiple suc-
cessive writes is txi, given that h is strong session serializ-
able, there is at least one successive write is in r. However,
txi is an obsolete transaction, hence the algorithm detects a
violation in E(h ◦ r) 	 txi (Claim 44). On the other hand, if
the write transaction is not txi, such transaction is detected
in E(h ◦ r) 	 txi the same way as in E(h ◦ r). For (2), by
Lemma 49, E(h◦ r)	 txi also has cycles which the algorithm
will reject.
Now, we consider the case when h ◦ r is not easily re-
jectable. Because h ◦ r is not easily rejectable, there is no
cycles in the known graph of Pp(E(h ◦ r)). In Pp(E(h ◦ r)),
by Lemma 51, all transactions in unsolved constraints that
involves txi are in the same P-SCC (call this P-SCC pscci).
Because txi in pscci is removable, by Definition 45, all trans-
actions in pscci are removable. Hence, no transaction in pscci
is involved in unsolved constraints with either future transac-
tions in r (Lemma 48) or other transactions in h (Lemma 51).
“⇒”. Next, we prove that Pp(E(h ◦ r)) is acyclic by con-
struction an acyclic compatible graph gˆ. By Fact 47, we only
need to concern unsolved constraints that might generate cy-
cles. Consider the transactions in h ◦ r but not in pscci, the
unsolved constraints are the same in both Pp(E(h ◦ r)) and
Pp(E(h◦r)	txi); given that Pp(E(h◦r)	txi) is acyclic, there
exists a combination of options for unsolved constraints that
makes gˆ acyclic in these transactions. Now, consider transac-
tions in pscci. Because all transactions in pscci are in h and
h is strong session serializable, there exists a combination of
options for the unsolved constraints in pscci so that gˆ has no
cycle in pscci. Finally, because there is no unsolved constraint
between pscci and other transactions in h ◦ r (proved in the
prior paragraph), gˆ is acyclic.
“⇐”. Because P(E(h ◦ r)) is acyclic, there exists an acyclic
compatible graph gˆ. We can construct a compatible graph gˆ′
for P(E(h ◦ r) 	 txi) by choosing all constraints according
to gˆ—choose the edges in constraints that appear in gˆ. Given
that the known graph in P(E(h ◦ r) 	 txi) is a subgraph of
P(E(h ◦ r))’s, gˆ′ is a subgraph of gˆ. Hence, gˆ′ is acyclic, and
P(E(h ◦ r)	 txi) is acyclic.
In the following, we use hi to represent the transactions
fetched in ith round. The first round’s history h1 is a complete
history itself; for the ith round (i ≥ 2), hi is a continuation of
the prior history h1 ◦ · · · ◦ hi−1. We also use di to denote the
transactions deleted in the ith round.
Lemma 53. Given that history h1 ◦· · ·◦hi ◦hi+1 is not easily
rejectable, if a transaction is removable in h1 ◦ · · · ◦ hi, then
it remains removable in h1 ◦ · · · ◦ hi ◦ hi+1.
Proof. Call this removable transaction txi and the P-SCC it is
in during round i as pscci. Because cobra’s algorithm does
not delete fence transactions (Figure 12, line 113), the epoch
numbers for normal transactions in round i remain the same
in round i+ 1. Hence, the epochagree in round i+ 1 is greater
than or equal to the one in round i. Thus, if cobra’s algo-
rithm (SetFrozen and GenFrontier) sets a transaction (for
example txi) as a candidate to remove in round i, it still is in
round i + 1.
Because history h1 ◦ · · · ◦ hi ◦ hi+1 is not easily rejectable,
transactions in pscci do not have cycles with transactions in
hi+1. Also, by Lemma 51, transactions in pscci do not have
unsolved constraints with hi+1. Thus, pscci remains to be a
P-SCC in round i + 1. Above all, by Definition 45, txi is re-
movable in round i + 1.
Theorem 54. cobra’s algorithm runs for n rounds and
doesn’t reject ⇐⇒ history h1 ◦ h2 · · · ◦ hn is strong session
serializable.
Proof. We prove by induction.
For the first round, cobra’s algorithm only gets history h1
(line 7) and constructs its extended history E(h1) (line 9). Be-
cause VerifySerializability doesn’t reject, the pruned co-
bra polygraph Qp(E(h1)) is acyclic, and
Qp(E(h1)) is acyclic
⇐⇒ Q(E(h1)) is acyclic [Lemma 28]
⇐⇒ h1 is strong session serializable [Lemma 27]
For round i, assume that history h1 ◦ h2 · · · ◦ hi−1 is strong
session serializable and cobra’s algorithm doesn’t reject for
the last i−1 rounds. In round i, cobra’ algorithm first fetches
hi, gets the extended history from the last round which is
E(h1 ◦ · · · ◦ hi−1) 	 (d0 ∪ · · · ∪ di−1), and constructs a
pruned cobra polygraphQp(E(E(h1◦· · ·◦hi−1)	(d0∪· · ·∪
di−1), hi)). In the following, we prove that cobra’s algorithm
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doesn’t reject (the pruned cobra polygraph is acyclic) if and
only if h1 ◦ · · · ◦ hi is strong session serializable.
Qp(E(E(h1 ◦ · · · ◦ hi−1)	 (d0 ∪ · · · ∪ di−1), hi)) is acyclic
⇐⇒ Qp(E(h1 ◦ · · · ◦ hi)	 (d0 ∪ · · · ∪ di−1)) is acyclic
[Lemma 50, 53]
⇐⇒ Pp(E(h1 ◦ · · · ◦ hi)	 (d0 ∪ · · · ∪ di−1)) is acyclic
[Lemma 28,27]
⇐⇒ Pp(E(h1 ◦ · · · ◦ hi)) is acyclic
[Theorem 52, Lemma 53]
⇐⇒ P(E(h1 ◦ · · · ◦ hi)) is acyclic
[Lemma 28]
⇐⇒ h1 ◦ · · · ◦ hi is strong session serializable
[Lemma 27]
30
